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Abstrakt
Tato diplomová práce zkoumá dopady fiskálních výdaju˚
na agregátní makroekonomické velicˇiny v Cˇeské republice.
Standardní modely reálných hospodárˇských cyklu˚ a nové
keynesiánské modely prˇedpokládají pouze vprˇedhledící do-
mácnosti, prˇestože literatura ukazuje na exitenci velkého
množství domácností, které spotrˇebovávají celý svu˚j beˇžný
du˚chod. Oba typy modelu˚ prˇedpovídají pokles spotrˇeby po
pozitivním šoku do vládních výdaju˚, což není konzistentní
s empirickou evidencí. Proto používáme pro analýzu modi-
fikaci nového keynesiánského modelu, ve kterém modelu-
jeme oba typy domácností - optimalizující i neoptimalizu-
jící.
V práci docházíme k záveˇru, že fiskální výdaje mají pozi-
tivní efekt na domácí produkt, prˇestože multiplikátor vlád-
ních výdaju˚ je menší než jedna. Vliv výdaju˚ na spotrˇebu je
také kladný beˇhem neˇkolika období po fiskálním šoku, což
je konzistentní s výsledky empirických modelu˚.
JEL klasifikace: C32, E32, E62
Klícˇová slova: fiskální politika, fiskální multiplikátory,
fiskální VAR, neoptimalizující spotrˇebitelé
iv
Abstract
This thesis investigates the effects of government spend-
ing on aggregate economic variables in the Czech Republic.
The standard RBC and New Keynesian models assume only
forward-looking households despite the evidence of a sig-
nificant fraction of non-optimizing households. These mod-
els do not provide reasonable predictions for the response of
consumption: both models predict its fall following a gov-
ernment spending shock. Therefore, a variant of the New
Keynesian model, where rule-of-thumb households coexist
with optimizing households, is used for the analysis.
We have found that fiscal policy has a positive impact on
output, although government spending multiplier does not
exceed one. Also, the impact on consumption is positive for
several periods following a fiscal spending shock, which is
consistent with the evidence.
JEL Classification: C32, E32, E62
Keywords: fiscal policy, fiscal multipliers, fiscal VAR, rule-
of-thumb consumers
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My thesis will study the impacts of the presence of rule-of-thumb (non-Ricardian) consumers on the 
behaviour of aggregate variables in the standard New Keynesian framework. The first part of the 
thesis will review the literature concerning the theory and empirics of consumption function with an 
emphasis on liquidity constraints, rule-of-thumb consumers and fiscal policy multipliers when the 
former two phenomena are taken into account. The purpose of the discussion will be to make a 
case for a need to introduce some form of non-Ricardian households into macroeconomic models, if 
the models are supposed to replicate and predict the reality sufficiently well, particularly the impacts 
of fiscal policy on consumption and other aggregate variables. 
The second part of the thesis will present a model that incorporates non-Ricardian households into 
the standard New Keynesian framework. I will follow a model described in Galí et al. (2004), which I 
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Hypotheses
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Outline:
 Introduction – a motivation  
 Literature review: a review of theory and empirical studies concerning the consumption function with 
liquidity constraints and rule-of-thumb consumers 
 The model 
 Calibration 
 Results, sensitivity analysis 
 Conclusions 
ThethesiswillutilizethestandardNewKeynesianframeworkinordertoassessthepropertiesofthe
aggregatevariableswhennonRicardianhouseholdscoexistwithRicardian(intertemporallyoptimizing)
households.
Theeconomywillconsistofthetwomentionedtypesofhouseholds;acompetitivefinalgoodssectorandan
intermediategoodssectorcharacterizedbymonopolisticcompetitionandpricestickiness(modeledbyCalvo
pricing);thegovernmentwhichimposeslumpsumtaxesonhouseholdsinordertofinancetransferstothe
householdsandothergovernmentalpurchases;monetaryauthoritythatpursuesmonetarypolicybysetting
thenominalinterestrates.
Theoptimalityandmarketclearingconditionswillbeloglinearizedaroundthesteadystatewhichwillresult
inareducedformdynamicalsystemconsistingof6equations.Theequationsmustsatisfycertain
determinacyconditionsinordertoprovideauniquesolutionofthedynamicalsystem.Theseconditionswill
bedescribedandexaminedwhenparametersofthemodelchange.Finallyandmostimportantly,thesystem
willbesolvedanditsdynamicssimulatedusingDynarepackageinMatlab.
1. ThepresenceofnonRicardianhouseholdsimpliesarelativelyhigherincreaseofaggregate
consumptionfollowingapositivefiscalshockcomparedtoanincreaseinthestandardNew
Keynesianmodel
2. TheeffectsoffiscalpolicydependontheproportionofnonRicardianhouseholdsonthepopulation
–thehighertheshareofruleofthumbhouseholds,thehigherthecrowdinginofconsumption
3. Theextentoftheconsumptioncrowdinginispositivelyrelatedtothedegreeofpricestickiness
4. TheuniquenessofthesolutionofthemodeldependsontheproportionofnonRicardian
householdsandthesolutionmaybeindeterminateeveniftheTaylorruleissatisfied
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Chapter1
Introduction
The recent global economic recession that followed the financial crisis has rekindled
the debate on the ability of fiscal policy to stabilize output. Several countries have
used fiscal measures to boost their economies because they were considered to be
efficient in the aftermath of financial turmoil. Moreover, monetary policies in many
countries were constrained by the zero lower bound, so fiscal policy was a natural tool
to boost economies. As a response, several economists and politicians have discussed
whether the costs of these policies are not greater than their benefits.
This thesis is a contribution to this discussion and to the relatively scarce litera-
ture on fiscal policy effects in the Czech Republic in that it analyses the impacts of
government expenditures on aggregate variables of the Czech economy. Because the
predictions of the standard real business cycles models and the New Keynesian mod-
els are not very convincing (particularly their predictions on consumption movement
after a government spending shock), I will use a modification of the New Keyne-
sian model, where the economy is populated by two types of households - one that
smooths its consumption and maximizes its lifetime utility; the other one that con-
sumes its current income, which might be caused by a restricted access to capital
markets or by its unwillingness to save or borrow funds. The inclusion of the rule-of-
thumb households is a sensible step because the evidence has shown that a significant
fraction of households does not optimize its consumption over its lifetime as the mod-
ern macroeconomic models assume.
I come to the conclusion that fiscal expenditures have a positive impact on the
economy, although government spending multiplier is not larger than one. The im-
pact on consumption is positive in several periods after the spending shock but this
increase is relatively small. This result fits the evidence better than the results by
1
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models that assume only optimizing households.
Three issues should be taken into account when one interprets the results of the
thesis. First, the model assumes a closed economy, while the Czech Republic is a
small open economy. However, one can expect that qualitative results would not
change under an open economy specification but the impacts on consumption and
output would be weaker. Next, the results of the model rely crucially on the param-
eters of fiscal policy. These have been estimated using a VAR model on a relatively
short time series and the results are not very robust with respect to the length of the
series. However, I have performed a sensitivity analysis with respect to both param-
eters, so one can observe how the predictions would change if the parameters were
altered. Finally, the model assumes that the economy was in the steady state before
the government spending shock occurs and it studies how aggregate variables deviate
from their steady state values. Also, the fraction of non-optimizing households has
been estimated on a time series of several years, which corresponds to an estimate of
medium or long run value of this parameter. In practice, fiscal measures are taken
when the economy is out of its steady state and one can expect that the share of
liquidity constrained households becomes higher in times of recessions. Therefore,
the effects and their magnitude can be expected to be slightly different from those
predicted by the model.
The thesis is structured in the following way. In the first part, I will provide an
overview of the milestones of the theory of consumption function in order to intro-
duce some concepts regarding consumption theory and liquidity constraints that will
be used subsequently. Next, I will compare how the standard neoclassical and Keyne-
sian models have coped with the predictions of the effects of fiscal policy. I will claim
that neither approach is sufficiently able to realistically describe those effects. More-
over I will show, that neither the standard New Keynesian model, which synthesizes
the Neoclassical and Keynesian models, provides realistic results, most notably of the
behaviour of consumption following a fiscal spending shock. As a possible resolution
of the issue, I will mention several New Keynesian models which incorporate rule-
of-thumb consumers, who are not forward looking and who consume their whole
current income in a given time period. The literature suggests that the inclusion of
rule-of-thumb households improves the predictions of he model, but the extent of this
improvement is limited when the model is estimated using the data of the eurozone.
Therefore, it seems that some other elements should be included in the models of fis-
cal policy. The second part of the literature overview discusses the findings of some
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empirical studies which analyse the effects of fiscal policy. The conclusion is that
these effects have become weaker over time and one possible reason of this decline is
the development of financial sector, which has enabled more household to participate
in financial markets and smooth their consumption.
The next chapter presents the results of a VAR analysis of fiscal policy effects in
the Czech economy, which are not covered sufficiently in the literature. Next, I will
describe in detail a model by Galí et al. (2007), which incorporates a simple version
of liquidity constraints into a relatively standard DSGE model. I will show how the
model is built and solved in detail. Then, I will calibrate the model to the parameters
of the Czech economy. I will use some parameters from the literature. But as the
model I will calibrate is relatively innovative, some of its parameters have not been
estimated for the Czech economy yet. Therefore, I will show how I have estimated
the remaining parameters - the share of rule-of-thumb households and fiscal policy
parameters. Then, I will present the results of the model, the behaviour of aggregate
variables and the results of a sensitivity analysis with respect to several parameters.
Finally, I will assess the model and provide some policy recommendations.
Chapter2
Literature overview
2.1 A brief history of consumption theory1
The modern literature on consumption stems generally from two seminal works: from
the life cycle model by Brumberg and Modigliani (1954) and permanent income model
by Friedman (1957). Both approaches are in a sharp contrast to the theory of consump-
tion by Keynes (1936) who claims that the level of current consumption is a function
of the current disposable income only. Instead, the two more recent models assert that
consumers optimize their consumption profiles intertemporally through their lifetime,
taking into account their income profiles. In their optimization, consumers regard
their consumption in each period as a different commodity and maximize their life-
time utility, which provides the theory of consumption with solid microfoundations.
The predictions of both theories are very similar - the optimization of a concave utility
function leads to consumption smoothing, i.e. one does not want her consumption to
fluctuate through time.
The following is a formalization of a consumer’s optimization problem. A very
similar form was introduced by Hall (1978) and it has been used ever since. Let ct
denote consumption in period t, U0(c0, c1, . . .) be an additive separable utility function
at time 0, u(ct) an instantaneous utility function, β = 11+ρ a discount factor, where ρ
is a discount rate. Next, let At denote assets held by a consumer at time t, yt be her
income in period t (which is not known until period t) and r a constant interest rate.
1This overview will by no means be exhaustive and the reader is referred to Deaton (1992) or
Attanasio (1999) to obtain a more thorough exposition to the subject and further references.
4
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The consumer solves the following dynamic programming problem:
max U0 = max{ct}∞t=0
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
⌉
, s.t. (2.1)
At+1 = (1+ r)At + yt − ct, ct ≥ 0 (2.2)
lim
t→∞
(
1
1+ r
)t
At ≥ 0 (2.3)
where Equation 2.2 is the law of motion of assets held by the consumer and Equa-
tion 2.3 is a no-Ponzi-game condition which ensures that the consumer’s debt does
not grow infinitely.
The Bellman equation associated with this dynamic programming problem can be
written as:
V(A) = max
At
{u((1+ r)At + yt − At+1) + βEtV(At+1)} (2.4)
and its solution is characterized by the following Euler equation:
u′(ct) =
1+ r
1+ ρ
Et
[
u′(ct+1)
]
(2.5)
Unfortunately, we cannot further examine any other properties of the consump-
tion function without imposing any assumptions on the parameters of the model.
And even if we impose some assumptions on the instantaneous utility function, we
usually do not obtain a closed-form solution for the consumption function. However,
it can be easily shown that if we assume that ρ = r (which holds in the steady state),
the utility function quadratic in consumption and expectations are rational, then the
consumption process follows a random walk: Et[ct+1] = ct. This is a very strong
result which means, that the only predictor of future consumption is the current level
of consumption. But this result is still not enough to study the the behaviour of the
consumption function. To obtain an expression for the current level of consumption,
we can plug the previous result into the law of motion of assets which results in:
ct = r
[
At +
1
1+ r
∞
∑
i=0
(
1
1+ r
)i
Etyt+i
]
= r(At + Ht) ≡ ypt (2.6)
This can be interpreted in a way that the consumption is equal to a return on
the life-time or permanent income (the sum of total assets held today and income
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from work from now on) ypt . We can recognize two changes in income - a transitory
change, which lasts only a limited number of periods; and a change in permanent
income, which influences an income through the lifetime of an individual. The first
change, e.g. a temporary tax cut which will be reversed by a tax hike in the future,
will have almost no effect on consumption today. On the other hand, an inheritance
increases the volume of assets of the consumer. According to the previous equation,
her permanent income rises and the value of inheritance is spread evenly into con-
sumption through the lifetime. The previous two cases imply that consumption is
much less responsive to current income than the consumption predicted by the Key-
nesian model and this is the reason why the permanent income hypothesis has been
widely embraced, because empirically, consumption responds to current income only
slightly.
The permanent income hypothesis has been tested by a number of authors both
on aggregate data and on panel data. References for studies of individual households
data can be found for instance in Attanasio (1999). In what follows, I will highlight
the most important results using the aggregate time series data.
A very important contribution to the empirics of consumption is by Hall (1978),
who tests whether consumption follows a random walk, as was shown previously in
this text. A rejection of the random walk would mean a rejection of the permanent
income hypothesis. A random walk property of consumption means that the only
predictor of consumption in period t + 1 is the level of consumption in period t. This
means that if we regress consumption in period t on any past variables, the only
variable that should be significant is the last level of consumption ct−1. Hall has
studied how several lagged variables influence the current consumption. For several
variables including the past level of income, consumption t− 2 etc., he has not rejected
the null hypothesis that the consumption follows a random walk. However, lagged
values (most importantly, the value in period t − 1) of stock market index, which
are an approximation of the past wealth, seem to be a significant predictor for the
level of consumption in period t. This rejects the pure permanent income hypothesis.
However, Hall suggests a modification of the permanent income hypothesis, which
takes into account that the adjustment of a part of consumption is time consuming.
His version of the permanent income hypothesis is consistent with the data.
Contrary to Hall, Flavin (1981) rejects the permanent income hypothesis. He as-
sumes an AR(1) process for a period income and estimates how consumption changes
as a result of innovations in the income. He comes to the conclusion that consump-
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tion is "excessively sensitive", i.e. it reacts more than the permanent income hypoth-
esis predicts. This can be regarded as an evidence against the permanent income
hypothesis.
Another evidence against the permanent income hypothesis is provided by Camp-
bell and Mankiw (1989), who propose an alternative hypothesis that the consumption
choices of a share of consumers do not follow a random walk. Instead, they consume
their current income. This behaviour can have several reasons, as Andersson (2010)
points out, and they include liquidity constraints, myopia or the use of a heuristic rule
in consumption decisions (therefore, the consumers that consume their whole income
are sometimes called rule-of-thumb consumers). Using an instrumental variable esti-
mation, Campbell and Mankiw find that approximately half of the households behave
in a rule-of-thumb way, which contradicts the permanent income hypothesis.
One of the mentioned reason for the rule of thumb behaviour are liquidity con-
straints. These mean that a consumer cannot borrow funds exceeding a given ceiling
or that she cannot borrow funds at all. Deaton (1992) presents three arguments why
liquidity constraints arise. First, it is perfectly consistent with theory that some people
do not want to borrow or save in any time in their life (this is given by their patience,
risk aversion and expectations of future income - when one anticipates that her income
will decline in the future, she will most likely be hesitant to borrow now). At the same
time, according to the life cycle hypothesis, there is a multitude of consumers who
want to borrow early in their lives and repay these loans later when their incomes rise.
But given the limited funds saved by the first group, the second group cannot borrow
the amount that they want, thus they face liquidity constraints. The second argument
why liquidity constraints emerge follows from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), who claim
that credit rationing is a result of long-term equilibria when interest rates do not clear
a loan market. It is because banks, by charging higher interest rates, would drive
out lenders who are likely to repay (because their investment projects have lower re-
turn and lower risk at the same time). Thus, by charging lower interest rates, banks
decrease the risk of their loan portfolio. At the same time, as the loan market does
not clear, credit rationing is an inevitable consequence. The last mentioned reason
of liquidity constraint follows from the theory of permanent income hypothesis. It
was shown in the previous section that under some assumptions the assets process
follows a random walk. That means that after a sufficiently long time, consumer’s
assets will either exceed a given ceiling or fall below a given floor. In the second case,
it is plausible that the consumer will not be able to borrow any amount of funds, thus
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW 8
the liquidity constraint emerges again.
Probably the most significant work on consumption with liquidity constraints is
by Deaton (1991). The author considers the problem described by Equations 2.1 and
2.2 with one additional constraint, At ≥ 0, meaning that consumers cannot borrow at
all. Apart from the standard assumptions of the permanent income hypothesis model,
two additional assumptions are imposed: ρ > r and u′′′(ct) > 0. The first assumption
means that consumers are impatient, which makes them borrow early in their lives.
The second, convexity of marginal utility is a necessary assumption for precautionary
behaviour. Deaton defines cash on hand xt = At + yt as the sum of assets that the
consumer holds and current income that the consumer receives. The Euler equation
from the dynamic programming problem can be written as:
λ(ct) = max
[
λ(xt),
1+ r
1+ ρ
Etλ(ct+1)
]
(2.7)
According to this Euler equation, if the consumer faces a liquidity constraint in
this period, she consumes all her available consumption. On the other hand, if the
consumer does not currently face the liquidity constraint, she consumes such amount
that equates the discounted expected marginal utility of consumption in the next
period to the current marginal utility of consumption. Despite its resemblance of the
second case with the solution of the permanent income hypothesis, the consumption
policy function is different from that case. Apparently, the policy function depends
on the expectations of future income and as the author showns, it is altered even if the
liquidity constraints are not binding at a given moment. In most cases, a possibility
that liquidity constraints will bind in the future lead to precautionary savings at a
time when they do not bind. The author has also shown that when the income process
follows a random walk, the consumers spend their whole income, i.e. they follow a
rule-of-thumb behaviour.
To summarize this section, it seems that the permanent income hypothesis is a
useful benchmark for the study of consumption. However, the departures from it can
be shown both empirically and theoretically on several grounds, one of them being
liquidity constraints. Therefore, one can argue that some form of liquidity constraints
should be incorporated into macroeconomic models that study the behaviour of con-
sumption. The problems stemming from their lack in the models of fiscal policy will
be presented in the subsequent sections.
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE OVERVIEW 9
2.2 Fiscal policy multipliers
The economic literature has not found a general consensus on the predictions of fiscal
policy effects. On the one hand, most of the authors agree that government spending
has a positive effect on output. On the other hand, the predictions of magnitude of
the increase in output differs both in the theoretical and empirical literature. The
impacts on the components of GDP and the amount of labour supply have also been
examined with varying results.
Before I provide an overview of some significant theoretical and empirical works
on the effects of fiscal policy, it is instructive to mention some concepts and issues.
First, fiscal shock means an unpredicted change in fiscal policy (Mountford and Uh-
lig, 2009). This definition is very broad and can include a multitude of instruments.
Nevertheless, what most of the literature is interested in are the impacts on macroe-
conomic variables of two basic types of shocks - government spending shock and
government revenue shock. Using only these two variables, one can study several
types of fiscal policies - a debt-financed tax cut, balanced budget fiscal spending etc.
The identification of the two shocks proves to be a relatively difficult task, since both
tax receipts and government spending move not only as a response to fiscal shocks
but also after automatic responses to changes in other variables embedded in laws and
legal arrangements. Speaking of receipts and expenditures of the government, these
are usually defined in the following way for the purposes of the analyses. Govern-
ment receipts are defined as total tax and social security contributions minus transfers
(including subsidies), and government expenditures are defined as the sum of gov-
ernment consumption plus investment.
The identification of fiscal shocks is difficult also due to the choice of the input data
that one uses for the econometric analysis. There is no consensus in the literature on
whether one should use fiscal data on a cash basis or an accrual basis. The receipts
and expenditures on the accrual basis are recorded at a time when an obligation to
transfer money is generated. On the other hand, the fiscal data on the cash basis are
recorded at a time when the money is transferred. Apparently, these two types of
time series are not equivalent, which might result in slightly different identification
of fiscal shocks.
Another issue pertaining to the timing of fiscal policy are inside and outside lags.
An outside lag is the time it takes for the policy to become effective. In this respect,
fiscal policy is more efficient than monetary policy, as Blinder (2004) argues, because
it works faster due to different transmission mechanisms but the lag length depends
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on the policy used. Generally, outside lags are considered shorter for transfers and
income tax cuts than for government spendings. On the other hand, fiscal policy
suffers from long inside lags. This is the time it takes from the moment that a policy
maker realizes that one should act to stabilize output to the moment when a measure
is taken. The reason for the long inside lags is a legislative process and administrative
reasons. Therefore, in this respect, fiscal policy is less effective compared to monetary
policy. In an extreme case, the original measure by the government can be modified
in and passed slowly through the parliament, so the conditions of the economy can
change by the time the measure is taken and as a result, its costs can largely exceed
its benefits.
Another feature that influences the effectiveness of fiscal policy is the Barro-Ricardian
equivalence. This proposition states that if consumers are forward-looking, then a
deficit financed lump sum tax cut (a policy aimed at income stabilisation) does not
have any impact on aggregate consumption. This is because the debt will have to be
repaid in the future by a tax hike which covers the debt including interest payments,
therefore the present value of life-time income, or permanent income, of consumers is
not affected at all. Only timing of receipts is affected, which, according to the theory,
does not matter. A tax cut, according to the proposition, only increases aggregate
savings. However, the assumptions, which include perfect markets, no liquidity con-
straints of households, identical interest rate for borrowers and lenders and perfect
rationality of consumers, are too strong to hold in reality. Some discussion and objec-
tions against the Barro-Ricardian equivalence are presented in Blinder (2004). One of
the most famous objections against the Barro-Ricardian equivalence is the imperfect
bequest motive, which means that the current generation does not treat its descen-
dants equally as themselves. However, Blinder (2004) claims that this argument is
largely irrelevant because issued bonds mature mostly during the lifetime of most of
the current generation. Another argument against the equivalence is the presence of
liquidity constraints, which means that current income matters more than permanent
income. Thus, liquidity constrained households do not smooth their consumption
perfectly, which leads to the failure of the equivalence. Another case when the equiv-
alence does not hold is when consumers have a different discount rate (or face a dif-
ferent interest rate) than the government. Next, savings can have a form of spending
on durables, thus tax cuts can induce an increase of aggregate demand. Also, myopia
of consumers can lead to the failure of the Barro-Ricardian equivalence. Finally, Blin-
der (2004) claims that the budget constraint of government holds only asymptotically,
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thus the basic assumption of the equivalence may not hold. He also reviews empirical
literature on the testing of the equivalence and comes to the conclusion that liquidity
constraints are the strongest argument why the equivalence might not hold. They im-
ply that consumption responds strongly to current cash income compared to future
tax changes.
The role of uncertainty is also very important when assessing the fiscal policy.
On the one hand, a deficit financed tax cut by the government means a reduction of
uncertainty, in that one receives more income today and expects less in the future.
Thus, precautionary motive for savings diminishes and consumption can rise today,
contrary to the predictions of the Barro-Ricardian equivalence. On the other hand,
interest rate premia and the loss of credibility have an opposite effect. Higher in-
debtedness leads to higher interest rates due to higher risk, which leads to crowding
out effects of investment. This implies that a temporary debt increase is more effec-
tive than permanent expansion because it leads to a lower risk. Also, credibility of a
policymaker to reverse spending is crucial in this context.
Political economy considerations are also important for the assessment of fiscal
policies. As Hemming et al. (2002) points out, the governments suffer from deficit
bias, which is an analogue of inflation bias in monetary policy analysis. In the long
run, the government should strive to achieve debt sustainability but in the short run,
the policy makers are tempted to use fiscal expansions for output stabilisation, which
is an example of time consistency problem. The credibility and history of policy
makers is therefore important for the policy effectiveness, because when it is low,
even a short term fiscal expansion can be deemed a long-term one and this leads to
lower efficiency.
Consumption smoothing described in the previous section also has significant im-
pacts on the answer to the question of whether fiscal policy should be used for sta-
bilisation purposes. This depends crucially on the properties of output time series
process. If output follows a deterministic trend (i.e. if it is trend stationary), it means
that it reverts back to its long run trend following a departure caused by a shock to
productivity or some of its components. Fiscal policy could be in this case used to
move the economy faster to its potential. The policy maker’s role would be to decide
on the speed with which the economy converges back and he or she should weigh
whether long run fiscal costs are not higher than the short term benefits. On the other
hand, if output has a stochastic trend (i.e. output is a process with a unit root), nega-
tive shocks to the economy do not disappear and there is no trend toward which the
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economy leads to. In other words, the economy is subject to hysteresis. In this case,
the goal of the fiscal policy is not the output stabilization, because there is no level to
which the output should be stabilized. Instead, the policy maker should, as Brusselen
(2009) points out, focus on long run growth or a target level of unemployment. So, the
fiscal policy would have a structural, instead of stabilizing role. As the author shows,
the literature used to conclude that the output had a unit root but recently more au-
thors have concluded that the output is mean reverting with structural breaks. One
issue that is related to liquidity constraints is worth to point out - mean reversion
is largely caused by consumption smoothing because the consumption is the largest
component of GDP. But if households are liquidity constrained, they cannot smooth
their consumption and this may cause that the output is not mean reverting.
Several recommendations for the recent economic recession can be drawn based
on this informal discussion that are in line with Spilimbergo et al. (2008). First, wealth
of a large number of households has decreased, which means a reduction of perma-
nent income. This is caused by a decline in property and share prices, by losing a
job and future abilities. As a result, due to a decline in permanent income, consump-
tion has decreased. Moreover, banks and other financial institutions have become
more cautious when providing credit to households - tighter liquidity constraints
have been imposed on households. As a result, they cannot smooth their consump-
tion and the consumption decreased as a result. Finally, higher uncertainty has lead to
higher precautionary savings and wait and see attitude. Fiscal policy response should
have the following characteristics. First, tax cuts will not be very effective because of
precautionary savings. Second, the policy should be aimed at liquidity constrained
households (to increase unemployment benefits etc.). Finally, the policy should be
stated clearly to reduce uncertainty. This includes a plan on when the policy will be
reversed. This transparency of policy should limit the extent to which interest rates
increase and crowding out effects should be mitigated.
2.2.1 Theoretical models of fiscal policy
The informal results from the previous section can be shown also formally, which will
be done in this part. It is natural to start the discussion on the theory of fiscal policy
with the Keynesian theory, following Keynes (1936). This tradition is based on the IS-
LM and Phillips curve models. The assumptions of the theory are met during times of
recessions, i.e. when it makes a good sense to use fiscal policy for output stabilization
and they include idle production capacities, fixed price level, and consumption being
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a function of disposable income. It follows that the output is a function of aggregate
demand and a fiscal expansion has the following effects: the multiplier is predicted
to be greater than one if the spending is deficit-financed; if the spending is financed
by an increase in taxation, the balanced-budget multiplier is predicted to be exactly
one. Because the disposable income rises, consumption rises as well. Due to higher
output and employment, wages rise and goods prices rise too.
This theory of fiscal policy effects was widely embraced (e.g. (Blinder, 2004)) and
fiscal policy was used for output stabilization in the 1960s. However, after the criti-
cism of the Phillips curve approach by Phelps and Friedman, together with stagflation
in the 1970s and the rise of the school of rational expectation, the traditional Keyne-
sian theory was abandoned. Also, the theory was criticized for the lack of microe-
conomic foundations. As a result, the theory was largely succeeded by the school
of real business cycles in mainstream economics, which assumes a forward looking
representative household, competitive markets and flexible prices. According to this
theory, effective demand does not play the role for the output determination, as in the
Keynesian model, and the level of output is determined by labour supply decisions,
decisions on savings by households and by the level of technological progress. Also,
because the Ricardian equivalence holds in these models, consumption falls when the
government debt is financed by lump sum taxes or labour supply decision are dis-
torted when the expenditures are financed by income tax. Therefore, the government
can have only a destabilizing role in the economy.
Despite the wide popularity of the RBC models, the effects of fiscal policy in these
models were not studied in a deeper detail until the paper by Baxter and King (1993)
was published. The authors provide an analysis of the fiscal policy effects in an
RBC model, which was modified in a number of ways. First, an instantaneous utility
function was extended so that it includes utility from government purchases and
capital (but none of them influences marginal utility from the consumption of private
goods). Second, the Cobb-Douglas production function now includes a public capital
and finally the resource constraint is adjusted by the inclusion of public spending.
If the expenditures are financed by lump sum taxes, the authors show that they can
have a multiplier effect (one percentage point increase in spending leads to an increase
in GDP larger than one) because a wealth effect (due to the fall of after-tax income in
the future) induces households to increase their labour supply. On the other hand,
consumption shrinks because of a negative wealth effect. As a result, consumption
and employment are negatively correlated following a positive government spending
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shock which, as we will see, is not supported by the data. A second conclusion is
that permanent spending has larger effect than temporary spending. Also, financing
decision is important. When spending is financed by taxes on labour income instead
of by lump sum taxes, the spending multiplier can be even negative. This is because a
higher tax rate decreases the incentive to work, which shrinks the output. Finally, the
means of government spendings is important. Most notably, government investments
may influence marginal product of private capital in a positive way, which brings
about a more positive multiplier effect.
The fact that the RBC models cannot cope with the evidence that consumption as
well as employment rise after a positive government spending shock made an incen-
tive to the introduction of imperfect competition and sticky prices into the economy
based on microeconomic foundations and gave rise to the New Keynesian economics
(or the New Neoclassical synthesis). Fiscal policy was introduced into this kind of
model by Linnemann and Schabert (2003). This model is a synthesis of the Keynesian
and RBC-type model in that it stresses the importance of both aggregate demand and
supply after a government shock. The reaction of supply side is the same as in RBC
models, since a wealth effect induces a higher labour supply. On the demand side,
the response of the central bank to the spending shock is important. If the reaction of
nominal interest rates is only low following the shock, real interest rate diminishes,
which further boosts the economy. As a result, the response of output is higher in this
model than in the RBC models. Also, monopolistic competition in the intermediate
sector presents an aggregate demand externality, in that an increase in government
expenditures induces higher profits of capital owners. However, the simulations show
that response of consumption is still negative following the shock, so the price stick-
iness and imperfect competition are not sufficient to explain the Keynesian effects of
consumption.
For a summary of basic mechanisms behind the Neoclassical and the New Key-
nesian models, see for instance the paper by Woodford (2010), who presents simple
forms of the models, which can be solved analytically. Also, a discussion of zero
lower bound is included. This has been particularly relevant during the recent global
recession, when short term interest rates of many central banks reached their effective
lower bound. In this case, fiscal expansion is most effective, because the central bank
does not act against the government. As expected inflation rises and interest rates are
kept at their lower-bound level, real interest rates decrease which multiplies positive
impact of government purchases on output.
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2.2.2 Empirical evidence of fiscal policy effects
As I have shown in the previous subsection, the predictions of fiscal policy effects
vary across the models. It makes little sense to discuss the validity of a model without
its testing on real data, so it is relatively surprising that the empirical testing of the
impacts of fiscal policies has started relatively recently, at the end of the 90s. Several
reasons had led to this timing.
One of the reasons why little attention was paid to fiscal policy during the 1990s is
that the focus of economics was put on monetary policy (Blinder, 2004). For example,
Solow (2004) says: "A reading of the literature on macroeconomic theory and policy would
lead you to believe that there is only one policy goal - the control of inflation - and that task is
assigned to monetary policy. Fiscal policy is either impossible or undesirable or both" (p. 1).
The reasons of an increased attention at the end of 90s include the rise of consumption
in the United States following several budget cuts, which contradicts the predictions
of Keynesian models. Also, the timing coincides with the formulation of the Stability
and growth pact in the EU. Finally, econometric techniques required for a proper
identification of fiscal shocks had not been used extensively before.
Fiscal policy effects have been studied using various approaches in the literature.
Hemming et al. (2002) is an example of a more comprehensive overview. In the
following text, I will briefly review the methods used in some of most significant
papers and present their results. Most of the papers use a VAR model to identify the
fiscal policy effects. I will also mention one panel study which claims that the level of
financial development is crucial for the transmission of fiscal shocks.
A test of the predictions of an RBC model with a fiscal authority is performed by
Fatás and Mihov (2001), who modify the model in a way that enables debt-financed
tax cuts or government spending increases. Furthermore, distortionary as well as
lump sum taxation is used to finance government expenditures and to repay the debt.
Their VAR analysis includes several macroeconomic variables as well as lagged
forecasts of current government spendings and taxations. This should isolate the ef-
fect of unanticipated fiscal policy changes from those that are anticipated. The reason
is that plans or forecasts of future tax policies influence, in theory, the behaviour of
households. And forecasts and plans about future government policies are usually
available a long time in advance - tax changes are announced several quarters before
they become effective; government spendings forecasts are announced by the gov-
ernment before a new fiscal year. However, as the authors claim, the inclusion of
these information to the VAR model does not qualitatively change the predictions of
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the model. Empirically, the authors identify the following results. First, the output
increases more than government spending, i.e. the government spending multiplier
is greater than one. This can be reconciled with the RBC model presented in the
paper. However, the reason for a multiplier effect is a significant rise in consump-
tion, which is predicted by the Keynesian theory and is in a contrast with the RBC
model. Also, hours worked rise after a government spending shock. This implies
that conditional correlation between employment and consumption after a govern-
ment spending shock is positive. This is in sharp contrast with the predictions of the
model. A possible reason is that real wage rises so much that income effect outweighs
substitution effect from house worked to leisure. Neither the VAR nor RBC model
provides a clear-cut prediction about the impact on investments. In the RBC model,
this impact depends on the elasticity of labour supply.
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) study the effects of fiscal shocks on the U.S. econ-
omy using a structural VAR model on the postwar data. Some of the identification
of structural shocks from the reduced-form shocks is based on the information on
timing (for example, as quarterly data are used, the authors assume that government
spending shocks are exogenous to contemporary shocks to GDP - fiscal measures are
taken, due to implementation lags and legislative procedures, with a long delay after
a productivity or demand shock takes place). The rest of the identification is based
on ordering and elasticities of tax receipts with respect to GDP. The results cannot be
easily reconciled solely using the Neoclassical or Keynesian theory. On the one hand,
positive fiscal shocks induce higher output and consumption, which is in a sharp con-
trast with the neoclassical theory’s predictions. On the other hand, both positive fiscal
and tax (increase of taxes) shocks have a negative impact on investments. This effect,
contrary to the first effect, is consistent with the predictions of the neoclassical models
but cannot be reconciled with the Keynesian theory. This is because the Keynesian
theory predicts opposing effects of tax and fiscal hikes on private investment. The
size of output multipliers varies during studied periods and based on assumptions
on GDP trend (whether it is assumed to be deterministic or stochastic) but generally
it is estimated to be close to one.
A similar approach has been taken in another paper by Perotti (2005), who es-
timates the effects of fiscal policy in five OECD countries. These countries include
Australia, Canada, West Germany, United Kingdom, United States - the countries
that have available non-interpolated data on quarterly government spendings and
revenues for sufficiently long periods. The analysis was extended to variables repre-
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senting price level (given by GDP deflator) and interest rates (given by 10-year nomi-
nal interest rate). The data are on quarterly frequency and range from the beginning
of 1960s to 2001. Also, the results are estimated for two subperiods, with the end of
the first one spanning from the mid 70s to the beginning of 80s. These dates coincide
with structural breaks of monetary policy identified by other VAR studies and are
approximately in the middle of the studied periods. Because of the inclusion of two
other variables, the author had to estimate additional elasticities - elasticity of gov-
ernment spending and taxes with respect to the interest rate and inflation. With this
identification, two types of shocks can be studied - government spending shocks and
tax shocks.
Similar qualitative results of spending and tax shocks are identified as in the pre-
vious paper - after a positive fiscal shock, government consumption and output rise.
However, if the break points in the 1980s are taken into account, the quantitative
results change in that the magnitude of the fiscal effect diminishes significantly. Gov-
ernment spending multiplier greater than one is identified only in the US in the first
period. Also, the effect on real interest rate and investment changes dramatically. In
the first sub-period, real interest falls after a fiscal shock. On the other hand, it rises
in the second sub-period. The direction of a change in investments is opposite - in-
vestment rises slightly in the first sub-period and fall in the second one after a fiscal
shock. Also, the author finds no evidence that tax cuts have a faster and higher effect
on the economy than an increase in spending. The author also suggests some reasons
for the decline in the efficiency of fiscal measures. The first one is the development
of financial sector, which caused a decline in liquidity constraints of households. As
a results, higher fraction of the economy behaves in a forward-looking way and the
Keynesian effects have become weaker. A second plausible explanation of the change
in the reaction of the economies to fiscal shocks is a change of monetary policies of
central banks and their more aggressive stance towards expected inflation and output
gap. Also, the author claims that the structural change in the response to fiscal policy
might be a cause of a lower variance of GDP in the 1990s.
The results of the previous papers have been further examined using an innovative
approach by Mountford and Uhlig (2009). The method is similar to the one introduced
by Uhlig (2005) and it relies on a Bayesian VAR estimation and the identification of
business cycle, monetary policy and fiscal shocks. The identification procedure does
not require as many assumptions and restrictions as the method in Blanchard and Per-
otti (2002). It only imposes some sign restrictions and rules on impulse responses to
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shocks. For example, business cycle shocks are characterized by an increase in output,
consumption, non-residential investments and government revenues for 4 subsequent
quarters. Several sign restrictions are put on the two remaining shocks - fiscal and
monetary shocks, one of them being that all shocks are orthogonal to each other.
Because three types of shocks have been identified, the authors are able to pro-
vide an analysis of three different policies. The first one is a deficit spending fiscal
shock. This means that government spending rises unexpectedly but taxes are kept
unchanged. This policy results in an increase of GDP and consumption in four quar-
ters but this rise is very weak. On the other hand, both residential and non-residential
investments fall, and price level falls as well. The second policy, deficit financed tax
cut, means that tax burden is cut by 1 % and government spendings stays at the same
level. This results in a rise of output, consumption and investment, with the peak
impact in the thrid quarter. Price level falls firstly and then it rises. The final policy,
balanced budget spending shock, means that spending is increased and taxes are in-
creased in such a way that the change in policy does not have any impact on budget
deficit or surplus in the fourth quarter following the policy change. This policy has a
small effect on GDP, consumption and investments and all of these variables fall. This
is because tax hike has a greater effect on GDP than tax spending.
The authors also compare their results with the results by Blanchard and Perotti
(2002). These are very similar for almost all aggregate variables, except for consump-
tion. The effect of fiscal shocks on consumption are identified to be very low and
significant only on impact. This contradicts the predictions of both RBC and Keyne-
sian models. The main policy recommendation from the paper is that the best way to
stimulate the economy in times of recessions are deficit financed tax cuts. However,
in the long run, the deficits have to be paid back. And the decrease of output caused
by a hike in taxes might be larger than an increase after the taxes are slashed. Thus,
from purely positive perspective, fiscal policy has larger costs than benefits.
To sum up, all of the mentioned papers provide a support to the hypothesis that
positive fiscal shocks, in the form of higher government consumption or tax cuts, have
a positive impact on output. However, this impact seems to diminish over time. A
comparison of the results is provided in Table 2.1. Also, none of the papers have
identified the prediction of both the Neoclassical and the new Keynesian models,
that private consumption falls after a government spending shock, due to the wealth
effect. On the contrary, the papers identify either a positive or an insignificant effect
of government spending on consumption.
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A different approach from the mentioned VAR analyses is used by Tagkalakis
(2008), who performs an analysis of a panel dataset of annual variables of 19 OECD
countries between 1970 and 2001. The author seeks to answer the question of how the
effects differ when the economy is growing (good times) or is in a slump (bad times).
In addition, the analysis seeks to answer what quantitative results the development
of consumer credit market has on the fiscal policy effects. A higher development of
consumer credit market means that less consumers are credit-constrained and it is
proxied as a maximum loan to value of the house ratio of first time buyers.
The first conclusion of the paper is that Keynesian effects prevail among all eco-
nomies, i.e. output and consumption rise following a spending shock. The effect
of fiscal spending on consumption is higher in countries with less developed credit
markets, i.e. in countries where liquidity constraints bind for a larger proportion of
population. Also, the impact on consumption differs over phases of business cycles.
Fiscal spending effects are higher in times of recessions because liquidity constraints
bind for more households. An interesting finding is that tax policy has a greater ef-
fect only in deep recessions in countries with a higher share of liquidity constrained
households.
2.3 Rule of thumb consumers in DSGE models
Based on the discussion so far, it is evident that models for fiscal policy analysis
miss some elements that would account for the rise of consumption following a fiscal
spending shock, a feature that is widely observed in reality. A possible resolution
might be to include some form of liquidity constraints into the models. Apparently,
the inclusion of liquidity constraints would cause a divergence of the economy from
that predicted by the models that assume only an optimizing representative house-
hold with an unlimited access to credit markets. The simplest way to model this fea-
ture is to assume that a proportion of the population spends its current income, i.e. to
assume the existence of hand-to-mouth households (these households are also called
rule-of-thumb or non-Ricardian households in the literature). Mankiw (2000) sum-
marizes the evidence of rule-of-thumb behaviour, which characterizes low-income
households with their net wealth approaching zero. One cannot assume that these
households smooth their consumption over their lifetime or even across generations,
as some models do. Therefore, the author claims that it is wrong to assume only one,
Ricardian, type of consumers and calls for the inclusion of rule-of-thumb households
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into macroeconomic models.
Some papers on fiscal policy effects have therefore incorporated rule-of-thumb
households into their analyses. Galí et al. (2007) extend their model in (Galí et al.,
2004) by an introduction of simple fiscal policy rules (the former model focused on
implications of the presence of non-Ricardian households on the monetary policy).
Lump sum taxes are levied on both types of consumers, so the non-Ricardian house-
holds consume their after-tax income, while optimizing households smooth their con-
sumption in the way predicted by other macroeconomic models. The deviation of
the level of taxes from its steady state responds to the deviation of the debt and
government expenditures from their steady state levels. The level of government ex-
penditures is determined by a highly persistent exogenous shock. This model will be
described in detail in the following chapter but its calibration to the U.S. data imply
that not only output, but also consumption rises as a response to positive govern-
ment spending shock. It is because the presence of rule-of-thumb households mean
a higher sensitivity to current income, which offsets negative wealth effect and the
shrinkage of consumption of optimizing households after a government spending
shock. Therefore, the model can be regarded as a synthesis of the Keynesian ap-
proach (predicting the sensitivity of consumption to disposable income) and the RBC
approach (assuming forward-looking behaviour of the rest of households).
A similar approach to model the effects of fiscal policies was taken by Coenen and
Straub (2004). They extend the DSGE model by Smets and Wouters (2002), which
provides plausible results except for the decline in consumption following a govern-
ment spending shock, which is not observed in reality. The authors incorporate three
features into the model - fiscal policy rule of the government, distortionary and lump
sum taxes and finally non-Ricardian households. Parameters of the model are esti-
mated using Bayesian inference and the results are not as positive as the results in the
model by Galí et al. (2007). On the one hand, consumption is higher on the impact
after a fiscal shock, compared to the baseline model with no rule of thumb house-
holds but the response of consumption is still negative. One reason for this is a low
share of non-Ricardian households, as the authors claim. The second reason is a high
persistence of government spending shock, which causes a negative wealth effect.
Due to the persistence of a shock, the households expect a larger rise of taxes in the
future and thus they save more to the detriment of consumption. Also, consistently
with Perotti (2005), the author claims that the development of financial markets has
diminished the extent of liquidity constraints and this can be seen as a source of the
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inability of fiscal policy to boost consumption.
Neither a more complex DSGE model of the eurozone by Ratto et al. (2009) does
predict a rise in consumption following a government spending shock. This model
regards the eurozone as an open economy and predicts a crowding out of both invest-
ment and consumption due to a spending shock. However, this follows, according to
the authors, from wage adjustment costs which are explicitly modelled. If these costs
approach zero, the model predicts by and large similar qualitative results as the one
in Galí et al. (2007).
More recently, Furceri and Mourougane (2010) extend the analysis even further
in that they explicitly model the interest rates on government bonds. These are a
function of monetary policy rate and market risk premia given by the expectations of
future debt, which is a measure of the debt sustainability. Next, the share of rule-of-
thumb households is assumed to be endogenous and being a function of the output
gap, which is consistent with the idea that liquidity constraints are binding more in
recessions than in expansions. Qualitative results are similar to the previous three
papers but the crowding out effect on investments and consumptions is higher. This
is because a higher interest rate on government bonds induces higher savings and
lower real investments.
From the discussion in this section, one can infer that rule-of-thumb behaviour of
households plays an important role for the analysis of fiscal policy. A standard New
Keynesian model, which includes rule-of-thumb households predicts the behaviour
of aggregate variables successfully in the U.S. This success is more limited when the
model is applied to the data of the eurozone. Although the behaviour of consumption
predicted by the model approaches more the one observed in reality compared to
the one disregarding rule-of-thumb households, the response of consumption to a
government spending shock is still negative. Therefore, it seems that some other
missing feature should be included in the models assessing fiscal policies. In the
subsequent chapters, I will show whether the inclusion of rule-of-thumb households
is sufficient to explain the effects of fiscal policy in the Czech Republic.
Chapter3
Fiscal policy effects in the Czech
Republic
3.1 A VAR model and its identification
To estimate the effects of an increase in government spending or taxation on the Czech
economy, I will use the approach by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Assume a reduced
form VAR model in the following basic specification:
Yt = µ+ K(L, q)Yt−1 +Ut
where Yt = [Gt, Yt, Tt]′ is a vector of endogenous quarterly variables representing
government spending on consumption and investments, GDP and the net taxes (i.e.
tax receipts minus transfers to households), respectively. K(L, q) is a lag polynomial
vector of order q and Ut = [gt, yt, tt]′ is a vector of reduced form error terms. The
specification includes also linear trend and seasonal dummy variables, that capture
the seasonality in tax receipts and spending, which is given by timing of tax receipts
and spending given by the law. The dummy and trend variables are for convenience
not included in the specification stated above.
The reduced form error terms have generally non-zero cross-correlations so using
them to make inference from the impulse response functions is misleading. Therefore,
we need to perform the following identification procedure. Assume that the reduced
form error terms have the following structure:
23
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tt = a1yt + a2e
g
t + e
t
t (3.1)
gt = b1yt + b2ett + e
g
t (3.2)
yt = c1tt + c2gt + e
y
t (3.3)
where ett, e
g
t , e
y
t are structural shocks to government revenues, spending and GDP,
respectively. This specification can be interpreted in the following way. According to
the first equation, the unexpected movements of tax receipts is a sum of a response
to unexpected movements in GDP, response to the structural shock to government
spending and to the structural shock to taxes. The unexpected movements of govern-
ment spending and GDP are interpreted in a similar way.
As quarterly data are used for the analysis, we can set b1 = 0. This is because the
data on GDP for a particular period are published with a delay so the policy reacts to
them with a lag of at least one quarter. Parameter a1 represents the elasticity of net
taxes to GDP, i.e. by how many percent tax receipts increase after a one percentage
increase in GDP. The elasticity parameter is taken from Barrios and Fargnoli (2010, p.
23) and its value is set at 1.3.
To estimate the values of c1 and c2, construct first the cyclically adjusted reduced-
form tax and spending residuals: t′t = tt − a1yt and g′t = gt − b1yt = gt. These
residuals are correlated with tt and gt respectively but they are not correlated with ext .
Therefore, we can use them as instruments for the estimation of c1 and c2.
The remaining coefficients, a2 and b2 are estimated based on ordering. In the first
one, assume that tax decisions come first. In this case, a2 = 0 and b2 is estimated. In
the second case, assume that spending decision comes first. Therefore, b2 = 0 and a2
is estimated.
The relationship among reduced form and structural errors can be written in a
matrix form as AUt = BEt, where Et = [ett, e
g
t , e
x
t ]:
1 0 −a1
0 1 −b1
−c1 −c2 1


tt
gt
yt
 =

1 a2 0
b2 1 0
0 0 1

Using a simple algebra, we obtain Ut = A−1BEt which allows us to study impulse
responses of variables to structural shocks.
In addition to the three mentioned endogenous variables in the VAR model, I have
included a fourth variable (as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002)) to study the responses
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of other aggregate variables to fiscal shocks. The following variables were substituted
as a fourth variable - consumption, private investments and hours. Structural iden-
tification of these variables was done by ordering, where I assume that the fourth
variable is ordered last. Also, one should bear in mind a very strong assumption
when the fourth variable is included. This assumption is that structural shocks to the
fourth variable is not correlated with structural shocks in other equations. Its validity
is questionable, but a solution is beyond the scope of this thesis.
3.1.1 Data and impulse responses
I have used time series spanning from 1998 to 2010 for the identification of fiscal policy
effects. All variables were downloaded from the Czech Statistical Office, except for the
data on government spending and revenues, which were obtained from the website
of the Ministry of Finance, which provides monthly data on spending and revenues
of the central government budget on a cash basis. The government spending variable
includes spending on government consumption and investment. The government
revenues, or net taxes, variable was computed as a difference between all tax receipts
(including social and health security contributions) and transfers.
The observations are on a quarterly basis and they were transformed into loga-
rithms of real per capita values. Moreover, all variables were seasonally adjusted us-
ing multiplicative X12 procedure. According to Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, none
of the variables has a unit root, so the inclusion of a deterministic trend into the
equation seems valid. Two lags of each endogenous variable were included in the
estimation, based on Schwarz information criterion. Other criteria suggest to include
more lags but because the time series is relatively short, a lot of degrees of freedom
would be lost due to the inclusion of more lags, so only two lags were chosen. Jarque-
Bera test of normality on residuals does not reject normality of individual residuals
or joint normality of all residuals.
Figure 3.1.1 shows impulse response functions of the three endogenous variables
to structural shocks identified using procedure stated above. The responses are nor-
malized to percentage changes of GDP. I have assumed that spending shocks precede
shocks to taxation, so b2 = 0 in the estimation and a2 is estimated. The figure shows a
positive response of GDP to a positive spending shock, which has its peak in the sec-
ond period after the shock. In the following periods, the response declines steadily.
Tax receipts increase accordingly, due to a rise in GDP. The second column of the
figure shows that a shock to GDP has a small positive effect on government expendi-
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tures. On the other hand, it has relatively high and persistent effect on both domestic
product and revenues of the government. Finally, a positive government revenue
shock has a negative impact on GDP, which firstly increases and then falls for several
periods.
It is interesting to compare the results of the preceding identification procedure
with the one based on ordering, where I assume that the government spending deci-
sions have a contemporaneous effect on both GDP and government revenues in the
current; shocks to GDP have an impact only on government revenues in the current
period; and shocks to government revenues have no contemporaneous effect on GDP
or government spending. The results are depicted in Figure 3.1.1. One qualitative
difference is worth to stress - in this case, GDP declines immediately after a revenues
shock, which is different from the previous case based on a different identification
procedure.
The impacts of shocks to government spending and revenues in a four-variable
model are depicted in Figure 3.1.1 and Figure 3.1.1, respectively. The figures show
responses in three four-variable models, where the fourth variable represents con-
sumption, investments and hours worked. Because the responses of other three vari-
ables (spending, GDP, revenues) differ under various specifications, their responses
are included in the figures as well. Following a spending shock, consumption rises,
which is a Keynesian effect identified in studies cited in the previous chapter. After a
shock to government revenues, consumption firstly rises negligibly and falls after five
periods. Concerning private investments, they rise slightly after a spending shock for
several periods. A response of investments is insignificant after a shock to revenues.
Finally, hours worked rise slightly after a for two periods and then stay stable. The
response of hours worked is slightly negative after a shock to revenues.
The analysis from this chapter has been performed in order to have some evidence
to which I will compare the predictions in the subsequent chapters. However, the
results should be interpreted cautiously because only relatively short time series of
the variables have been used for the estimation.
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Figure 3.1: Responses of endogenous variables to structural shocks, identification using restriction
on elasticity, 1 s.e. confidence bands; all responses are normalized by the component’s share on GDP
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Figure 3.2: Responses of endogenous variables to structural shocks, identification based on ordering,
1 s.e. confidence bands; all responses are normalized by the component’s share on GDP
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Figure 3.3: Responses of endogenous variables to government spending shock, 1 s.e. confidence
bands; four different specifications
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Figure 3.4: Responses of endogenous variables to government revenues shock, 1 s.e. confidence
bands; four different specifications
Chapter4
The model
Based on the discussion in the literature review, it is evident that liquidity constraints
play a very important role when one studies the properties of consumption and the
effects of fiscal policy. Thus, we should not disregard the fact that liquidity con-
straints bind the behaviour of households, which departs significantly from the one
that would arise when the households had an unlimited access to credit markets. This
chapter presents a model in which I will quantify how the predictions of the New Key-
nesian framework change under the presence of liquidity constrained households. I
will follow closely the model by Galí et al. (2007), which shows the impacts of fiscal
spending shocks in the presence of non-Ricardian households. The calibration, model
predictions and sensitivity analyses with respect to several parameters for the Czech
economy will be presented in the subsequent chapters.
The model consists of six building blocks which will be described in detail subse-
quently. Figure 4.1 provides an overview of real, tax and transfer flows in the model.
The model assumes a closed economy, which consists of Ricardian (intertemporally
optimizing) households, non-Ricardian (rule-of-thumb) households, a final goods sec-
tor, an intermediate goods sector, the government and finally the monetary authority.
The households supply labour and capital (they are the only ultimate capital own-
ers) to the continuum of intermediate goods firms. The intermediate goods sector is
characterized by staggered price setting and monopolistic competition. So, each firm
maximizes its expected profit subject to the demand by the final goods sector. The
frequency of price setting is modelled using the approach by Calvo (1983). Unlike the
intermediate goods sector, the final goods sector is characterized by perfect competi-
tion and flexible price setting, so it can be modelled using one representative firm. The
product of the final goods firm is equal to the gross domestic product, which can be
30
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Figure 4.1: A flow diagram of the model
decomposed into the household and the government consumption and investments.
Next, the government expenses, i.e. consumption, which is determined stochastically,
and transfers, are financed by lump-sum taxes imposed on households. Finally, the
monetary authority (the central bank) sets the nominal interest rate in order to achieve
price stability. The remainder of this chapter presents the details of each sector’s de-
cision making, equilibrium conditions and their log-linear representation, which will
be used for an approximate solution in the subsequent chapter.
4.1 Households
The economy of this model is assumed to be inhabited by a continuum of measure
one of infinitely lived households. The households are assumed to be of two types.
The first type, Ricardian or intertemporally optimizing households, is maximizing its
lifetime utility subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. These households have
an unlimited access to capital markets, so they can borrow or save funds without
any constraints. The second type, rule-of-thumb households, cannot access capital
markets (or they do not want to), and the households of this type consume their
current labour income completely. It is assumed that 1 − λ ∈ [0, 1] of households
belong to the first group, while λ households belong to the second group.
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4.1.1 Ricardian households
A typical Ricardian household maximizes its lifetime utility subject to its intertempo-
ral budget constraint. This constraint states that the expenses of the household (on
consumption, investments and purchases of government bonds) cannot exceed its in-
come given by wage, capital income, face value of bonds (with a one-year maturity)
held since the previous period, dividends and net governmental transfers (the differ-
ence between transfers and lump sum taxes paid by the household). Next, the capital
held by the households depreciates at a constant rate and investments are subject to
adjustment costs.
The following notation will be used throughout the text. Consumption in period
t by Ricardian households will be denoted by Cot and their labour supply by N
o
t . The
period utility U(Cot , N
o
t ) will be discounted by the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). The
dynamic programming problem of Ricardian households is stated by the following
three expressions:
max
{Cot ,Not }∞t=0
E0
∞
∑
t=0
βtU(Cot , N
o
t ), s.t. (4.1)
Pt(Cot + I
o
t ) + R
−1
t B
o
t+1 = WtN
o
t + R
k
t K
o
t + B
o
t + D
o
t − PtTt (4.2)
Kot+1 = (1− δ)Kot + φ
(
Iot
Kot
)
Kot (4.3)
Where 4.2 is the budget constraint and 4.3 is the law of motion of capital, which
is owned by the Ricardian households. In Equation 4.2, Pt represents the price level
in period t, Wt the nominal wage, Rkt nominal rental costs of capital. B
o
t is the amount
of bonds with face value equal to one unit of consumption good in period t which
were purchased by the household in period t − 1. Similarly, Bot+1 denotes bonds
with maturity in period t + 1. Gross nominal return on bonds purchased in period
t is denoted by Rt. Dividends to the company owners are denoted by Dot , taxes
(or transfers) in real terms by Tt. Consumption and investments, in real terms, are
denoted by Cot and I
o
t , respectively.
Consistently with Tobin’s theory, the adjustment of the capital level requires ad-
justment costs, captured by the φ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt term. The function φ(.) is assumed to be
increasing, concave and it is further assumed that φ′(δ) = 1 and φ(δ) = δ.
For the calibration of the model, I will use, consistently with Galí et al. (2007), the
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instantaneous utility function of the form
U(Cot , N
o
t ) ≡ log Cot −
(Not )
1+ϕ
1+ ϕ
, ϕ ≥ 0 (4.4)
where ϕ ≥ 0 is the inverse of Frisch labour supply elasticity (with respect to
wages).
First order conditions
The first order conditions can be obtained either by the optimization of a constrained
maximization problem (using the method of Lagrange multipliers) or by the opti-
mization of a Bellman equation. I will use the second approach for obtaining the first
order conditions of the household’s optimization problem.
Before deriving the first order conditions, it is useful to state a result that follows
from the capital accumulation equation. Since the capital adjustments costs function
φ(.) is strictly increasing, its inverse function φ−1(.) exists. Therefore, we can write
the amount of investments in period t as:
Iot = φ
−1
(
Kot+1 − (1− δ)Kot
Kot
)
Kot (4.5)
A Bellman equation associated with Ricardian households optimization problem
is defined as:
V(Kot , B
o
t ) = max
Kot+1,N
o
t ,B
o
t+1
{
U(Cot , N
o
t ) + βEtV(K
o
t+1, B
o
t+1)
}
(4.6)
where we substitute for consumption from:
Cot =
Wt
Pt
Not +
Rt
Pt
Kot +
Bot
Pt
+
Dot
Pt
− Tot − Iot −
R−1t
Pt
Bot+1 (4.7)
and for investments from Equation 4.5.
The following equations follow from the first order conditions of the Bellman equa-
tion:
PtQt = Et
{
Λt,t+1
[
Rkt+1 + Pt+1Qt+1
(
(1− δ) + φt+1 −
(
Iot+1
Kot+1
)
φ′t+1
)]}
(4.8)
Wt
Pt
= Nϕt Ct (4.9)
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1 = RtEt {Λt,t+1} (4.10)
where Qt denotes Tobin’s Q, the real shadow value of capital and where Λt,t+1 is
a one period stochastic discount factor. Its general form has the following form:
Λt,t+k ≡ βk
(Cot+k
Cot
)(
Pt
Pt+k
)
(4.11)
In the basic New Keynesian models, as well as in RBC type models, labour sup-
ply is determined jointly by households and firms and the labour market is cleared
through wages. It is not the case in this model. Here, it is assumed that only firms
determine the amount of working hours at a given wage. It is also assumed that the
wage is higher than the households’ marginal rate of substitution between hours and
consumption, so the households work the amount of hours demanded by the firms.
4.1.2 Non-Ricardian Households
The second type of households, non-Ricardian or rule-of-thumb households, do not
take part in capital market activities. Therefore, they do not own any capital that
would be rented to intermediate goods firms. Also, they do not save or borrow funds.
Several reasons for their inactivity in the financial markets exist - the households
might have no access to the market, their budget constraints are binding (or might be
binding in the future - see the discussion on the paper by Deaton (1991) above), they
are myopic regarding their future or simply they do not want to enter the financial
markets.
The non-Ricardian households derive their utility from the utility function U(Crt , L
r
t)
subject to
PtCrt = WtN
r
t − PtTt (4.12)
(again, the labour supply is determined by the firms). As the households do not
optimize intertemporally, they consume their whole income:
Crt =
Wt
Pt
Nrt − Tt (4.13)
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4.2 Final-Goods Sector
Consumption goods are produced in the final-goods sector which is characterized by
perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Due to these characteristics, we can
assume that there is one single representative firm selling its output at a price equal
to the marginal costs.
The firm produces the consumption goods using intermediate goods (which are of
continuum of measure of one) by CES technology and its profit maximization problem
can be stated in the following way:
max
Xt(j)
Pt
[∫ 1
0
Xt(j)
e−1
e dj
] e
e−1
−
∫ 1
0
Pt(j)Xt(j)dj (4.14)
where Xt(j) and Pt(j) are the amount and price of the j-th intermediate good,
respectively; Pt is the final good’s price, which is taken as given, and e is the elasticity
of substitution parameter.
The demand schedules follow from the first order conditions of the maximization
problem:
Xt(j) =
[
Pt(j)
Pt
]−e
(4.15)
From the zero profit condition, we have Pt =
∫ 1
0 Pt(j)Xt(j)dj (unit price is equal
to unit costs), which results in an expression of the final goods price in terms of the
prices of the intermediate goods:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(j)1−edj
] 1
1−e
(4.16)
4.3 Intermediate-goods sector
A typical intermediate-goods firm j minimizes its real costs of producing the quantity
Yt(j) demanded by final good sector. The firms use a Cobb-Douglass production
technology:
Yt(j) = Kt(j)αNt(j)(1−α) (4.17)
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The Lagrangian associated with the j-th firm optimization problem is
L = −Wt
Pt
Nt − R
k
t
Pt
Kt + λ
(
KαN1−α −Yt(j)
)
(4.18)
where Yt(j) = Xt(j).
From the first order conditions, we can derive the following optimal capital/labour
ratio,
Kt
Nt
=
α
1− α
Wt
Rkt
(4.19)
conditional factor demands
Nt =
(
α
1− α
)−α(Wt
Rkt
)−α
Yt (4.20)
Kt =
(
α
1− α
)1−α(Wt
Rkt
)1−α
Yt (4.21)
and the real marginal costs:
MCt =
(
Wt
Pt
)1−α (Rt
Pt
)α 1
Φ
(4.22)
where Φ ≡ αα(1− α)1−α
Price setting and dynamics
Price setting by intermediate firms is done in a staggered way, that is firms cannot
change their prices optimally in every period. Instead, it is assumed that only a frac-
tion of the firms reset their prices every period. This proportion is set stochastically in
a way proposed by Calvo (1983). Intuitively, we assume that a measure 1− θ, where
θ ∈ (0, 1), of the firms are visited by the Calvo fairy, who allows them to change their
prices for uncertain number of periods (until the Calvo fairy visits the firms again;
the way the Calvo fairy visits firms is stochastically independent).
In what follows, I will show how intermediate-goods firms set their prices op-
timally (because the firms are symmetric, I omit the subscript at the optimal price
term). First, assume that the firms which change their prices set the optimal prices at
the level of P∗t . Then the price level in period t is:
Pt =
[
θP1−et−1 + (1− θ)(P∗t )1−e
] 1
1−e (4.23)
which follows from Equation 4.16.
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The optimal price set by firms in period t is found by solving the following prob-
lem:
max
P∗t
∞
∑
k=0
Et {Λt,t+kYt+k(j)(P∗t − Pt+k MCt+k)} (4.24)
subject to Yt+k(j) = Xt+k(j) =
[
P∗t
Pt+k
]−e
Yt+k
That is, the firms maximize their expected discounted profit with respect to two
sources of uncertainty: the first one is that the firms are not sure whether they will
be allowed to change their price in period t + k; the second is the uncertain level of
prices, wages and return on capital in period t + k. The firms discount the stream of
profits by the stochastic discounting factor from the consumer’s optimization prob-
lem. The reason for this is that households are the ultimate capital owners and require
the return on capital equal to Λt,t+k. Also, it is interesting to observe that Equation
4.24 is not the net expected discounted profit but instead only the part of it which ac-
crues when the firms’ prices remain constant. But the maximization problem remains
equivalent to the former one because if the prices are changed in the future, they are
set optimally in the same way.
The first order condition associated with Equation 4.24 is:
∞
∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Λt,t+kYt+k(j)
(
P∗t −
e
e− 1 Pt+k MCt+k
)}
= 0 (4.25)
4.4 Labour market
As I have already mentioned in the section describing the behaviour of households,
labour market is not modelled explicitly in this model. Instead, it is assumed that
there exists a wage schedule:
Wt
Pt
= H(Ct, Nt)
where HC > 0 and HN > 0. These assumptions capture both convex marginal
disutility of labour and wealth effects of wage. Firms decide how much labour to hire
given the prevailing wage, which is assumed to be larger than the one demanded
by households given the amount of labour, based on their first order conditions:
H(Ct, Nt) > C
j
t N
ϕ
t , i = r, o. Therefore, the labour supply will always meet the amount
of labour demanded by the firms. Also, firms do not discriminate among the types of
households, so Nrt = N
o
t .
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4.5 The government
The government’s expenditures consist of two parts - the first is the repayment of
one-year bonds and the second part is the actual government consumption.
The receipts of government finance stem from lump-sum taxes and the face value
of bonds, which mature in the next period. These receipts are used to repay bonds
issued in the previous period and to finance the government consumption in this
period. The government budget constraint can be written as:
PtTt + R−1t Bt+1 = Bt + PtGt (4.26)
A fiscal policy rule is determined in a way to close the deviations of government
debt and government expenditures from the steady state values normalized by the
steady state income. So, the fiscal policy rule has the following form:
tt = φbbt + φggt (4.27)
where gt = Gt−GY , tt =
Tt−T
Y , bt =
Bt/Pt−1−B/P
Y are deviation of government expen-
ditures, taxes and real bond holdings from their steady state values normalized by
steady state income. In the steady state, we assume a balanced budget (T = G) and
zero level of debt (B = 0). Apparently, the policy parameters φb and φg are positive
constants.
The government consumption (in terms of its deviations from the steady state
normalized by the steady state of output) follows an AR(1) process:
gt = ρggt−1 + et (4.28)
where 0 < ρg < 1 and et is a white noise process with constant variance σ2e which
represents a shock to the government consumption.
4.6 The monetary authority
The central bank in this model determines the nominal interesting rate by following
a simple version of the Taylor rule (Taylor (1993)):
rt = r + φpipit (4.29)
where rt ≡ Rt − 1 is the nominal interest rate, r is the steady state interest rate
(r = β−1 − 1) and φpi ≥ 0 is the parameter of the response of interest rate to inflation.
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This Taylor rule is simplified in that the monetary policy seeks to stabilize the price
level only, disregarding the level of output gap. A well known result, known as the
Taylor principle, states that if φpi > 1, the solution of the model is unique. However,
as we will see later, this is not the case in this model, due to the presence of rule-of-
thumb households.
4.7 Equilibrium conditions
The equilibrium of the economy described by this model is characterized by the fol-
lowing conditions:
• Households, intermediate and final-goods firms, the government and the mon-
etary authority maximize their optimization problems in each time period t.
• Aggregation conditions
– Aggregate consumption: Ct ≡ λCrt + (1− λ)Cot
Total consumption is equal to the sum of consumption of optimizing and
non-optimizing households.
– Aggregate investments: It ≡ (1− λ)Iot
Investments are made only by Ricardian households, so only a proportion
1− λ of their investments counts as total investments
– Aggregate capital: Kt ≡ (1− λ)Kot
Similarly, only a proportion of 1− λ of capital counts as total capital sup-
plied
– Aggregate labour supply: Nt ≡ λNrt + (1− λ)Not = Nrt = Not
Both types of households supply the same amount of labour
• Market clearing conditions
– Labour market clears: Nt =
∫ 1
0 Nt(j)dj
Total labour supplied by households is equal to total labour demanded by
intermediate good sector.
– Capital market clears: Kt =
∫ 1
0 Kt(j)dj
Total capital supplied by Ricardian households is equal to the total capital
demanded by firms.
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– Intermediate goods market clears: Yt(j) = Xt(j), ∀j
Demand for each good j is equal to supply of good j in each period t
• Final good market clears: Yt = Ct + It + Gt in each time period t.
Total GDP is equal to the sum of consumption, investments and government
expenditures.
4.8 Log-linearized equilibrium conditions
The model described in the previous section is relatively complex and its precise solu-
tion by function iterations or similar methods would be prohibitively time-consuming.
Instead, a numerical method based on the approximation of equilibrium solution
around its steady-stead will be used. The principle of the method will be sketched in
the following chapter and the log-linearized equations are derived in the Appendix.
In this section, I will present the log-linear approximation of equilibrium conditions
around their steady state values.
The following notational convention will be used. Lower-case letters will denote
natural logarithm of a variable or a log-deviation of a variable from its steady state
value. So, for example yt = log Yt − log Y¯, where log is the natural logarithm of a
variable and Y is the steady state value of income.
4.8.1 Households
The dynamics of Tobin’s Q is described by the following log-linear approximation:
qt = βEt {qt+1}+ [1− β(1− δ)] Et
{
rkt+1 − pt+1
}
− (rt − Etpit+1) (4.30)
The relation between the dynamics of Tobin’s q and investment is given by:
it − kt = ηqt (4.31)
where η ≡ − 1
φ′′(δ)δ is the elasticity of the investment-capital ratio with respect to
Q in the steady state.
Capital accumulation equation is approximated by the following equation:
kt+1 = δit + (1− δ)kt (4.32)
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The following equations summarize the consumption decisions of households. Let
γo ≡ CoC be the share of consumption of optimizing households on the total consump-
tion. Then the following equation pertains to optimizing households:
cot = Et
{
cot+1
}− γo(rt − E {pit+1}) (4.33)
where cot ≡ C
o
t−Co
C .
Wage-schedule consistent with balanced growth is approximated by:
wt − pt = ct + ψnt (4.34)
where ψ is the elasticity of wages with respect to hours.
This can be used to describe the consumption decisions of non-Ricardian house-
holds. Let crt ≡ C
r
t−Cr
C . Then
crt =
(
WN
PC
)
[ct + (1+ ψ)nt]−
(
Y
C
)
tt (4.35)
approximates the consumption decisions of non-Ricardian households.
Log-linear version of consumption aggregation is given by:
ct = λcrt + (1− λ)cot (4.36)
where cot ≡ C
o
t−Co
C . When the decisions of both types of households are plugged
into the previous equation, we obtain an aggregate equilibrium condition for con-
sumption:
ct = Et {ct+1} − 1˜˜σ (rt − Et {pit+1} − ρ)−ΘnEt {∆nt+1}+ΘτEt {∆tt+1} (4.37)
where
σ˜ ≡ γc − λ(1− α)(1−
1
e )
γoγc(1− λ) (4.38)
Θn =
λ(1− α)(1+ ψ)
γc( ee−1)− λ(1− α)
(4.39)
Θτ =
λ(1+ µp)
γc( ee−1)− λ(1− α)
(4.40)
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where γc = CY is the steady state share of consumption on output. The last log-
linear relationship is the only one dependent on the share of rule-of-thumb house-
holds λ. Also notice that as this share approaches zero, we obtain an analogue of the
standard dynamic IS curve:
ct = Et {ct+1} − (rt − Et {pit+1} − ρ) (4.41)
From the previous equations, one can observe that the presence of rule-of-thumb
households makes the growth of aggregate consumption directly dependent on the
growth of employment and also on the growth of taxes, even when they are not
distortionary.
4.8.2 Firms
The dynamics of inflation as a function of the deviations of the average logarithm of
markup from its steady state can be obtained from Equation 4.23 and Equation 4.25:
pit = βEt {pit+1} − λpµpt (4.42)
where
λp =
(1− βθ)(1− θ)
θ
(4.43)
and
µ
p
t = (yt − nt)− (wt − pt) (4.44)
when we ignore constant terms. This is equivalent to
µ
p
t = (yt − kt)− (rkt − pt) (4.45)
A first order approximation of the aggregate production yields:
yt = (1− α)nt + αkt (4.46)
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4.8.3 The government
Let ρ ≡ β−1 − 1 denote the steady state interest rate. By log-linearization of govern-
ment budget constraint (Equation 4.26), we obtain:
bt+1 = (1+ ρ)(bt + gt − tt) (4.47)
Plugging in the fiscal policy rule yields:
bt+1 = (1+ ρ)(1− φb)bt + (1+ ρ)(1− φg)gt (4.48)
In order to obtain stationary process of the level of debt, we need to impose a
condition that (1+ ρ)(1− φb) < 1. This is equivalent to φb > ρ1+ρ
4.8.4 Monetary authority
The policy function of the central bank is already in the log-linear form so there is no
need to transform it further.
4.8.5 Market clearing condition
By a simple log-linearization, one obtains:
yt = γcct + γiit + gt (4.49)
where γi = I¯Y¯ denotes the steady state share of investments on total output.
Chapter5
Solution and calibration of the model
5.1 Solution of the model
The model described so far is very complex and cannot be solved analytically, i.e.
no closed-form solution of policy functions of households and firms exist. Instead,
several numerical methods are used to solve such type of complex macroeconomic
models. I will use a collection of numerical routines Dynare for Matlab R©/Octave to
solve the model. According to the reference manual, Dynare uses the methods by
Klein (2000) and Sims (2002) to solve first-order approximation of stochastic models.
The details of the method, which is one of a variety methods that solve linear rational
expectations models, are not very important for the sake of this thesis.
The log-linearized equilibrium conditions from the previous chapter can be trans-
foremed into a reduced form system: AEt {xt+1} = Bxt + et where xt ≡ [nt, ct,pit, kt, bt, gt−1]T,
A =

0 0 0 1 0 δ1−γ˜c
0 0 β 0 0 0
−Θn 1 1σ˜ 0 Θtφb Θt(ρg − 1)φg
ω(1+ ψ) + β(1− α) ω− βγc (1− γ˜c)η − [ω+ β(1− γ˜c − α)] 0 (1− βρg)
0 0 0 0 1 −(1+ ρ)(1− φg)
0 0 0 0 0 1

(5.1)
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and
B =

δ(1−α)
1−γ˜c −
δγc
1−γ˜c 0 1− δ+ δα1−γ¯c 0 0
−(α+ ψ)λp −λp 1 αλp 0 0
−Θn 1 φpiσ 0 Θtφb 0
(1− α) −γc (1− γ˜c)ηφpi γ˜c + α− 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 (1+ ρ)(1− φb) 0
0 0 0 0 0 ρg

(5.2)
5.2 Calibration
This part of the chapter presents how the parameters of the model have been chosen.
Some of them have been adopted from the literature and others have been estimated.
A special attention has been paid to the estimation of fiscal policy parameters and
the share of rule of thumb households, which are essential features of the model and
have not been estimated using the Czech data yet. Therefore, special subsections are
devoted to their estimation.
One period is assumed to represent a quarter. Discount factor of households is
taken from Natalucci and Ravenna (2002) and its value is set to 0.99. This implies the
steady state quarterly real interest rate ρ = 1β − 1 = 0.01. The yearly depreciation rate
is set to 0.1, which implies the quarterly depreciation rate δ = 0.025
Elasticity of labour supply is taken to be 2, implying φ = ψ = 12 = 0.5 (accord-
ing to Natalucci and Ravenna (2002)). Parameter η, the elasticity of the investment-
capital ratio with respect to Tobin Q, is set to 2. Steady-state mark-up is defined as
µp = ee−1 = 0.1. This is consistent with the value of elasticity of substitution among
intermediate goods of e = 11.
The literature does not provide a consensus on the estimate of parameter θ, which
is the probability that a firm will not adjust its price during the next period. That is,
this parameter represents the inflexibility of prices in the intermediate goods sector.
For example, Natalucci and Ravenna (2002) assume this parameter to be 0.85. Simi-
larly, Danišková and Fidrmuc (2011) estimates the parameter θ as ranging from 0.708
to 0.898 under various specifications. Vašıcek and Musil (2006) estimate the param-
eter to be slightly lower, 0.64. Finally, Štork et al. (2009) assume that the parameter
value is 0.5. For the purposes of this model, the baseline value of parameter θ was
chosen as 0.8, which is in line with the first two mentioned papers. The third paper
estimates the parameter using Bayesian inference when other stickiness are present
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in the model, thus its value is lower. Average length of price non-adjustment can be
calculated as 11−θ .
Parameter α from the Cobb-Douglas production function of the final goods sector
represents the elasticity of output with respect to capital. Also, it represents the share
of capital income when markets are competitive and factors of production are paid
their marginal products. Similarly, parameter 1− α represents the share of output that
is paid to labour. Following Hájková and Hurník (2007), I have used the following
formula to estimate parameter α:
1− αt = TLCtLtGVAt
where TLCt is total nominal labour cost per employee adjusted for hours worked,
Lt is total employment in the economy and GVAt is gross value added in nominal
terms. The data available from the Czech Statistical Office are available for monthly
averages and can be used after slight adjustment for the estimation. The resulting
values of parameter α range from 0.412 to 0.418 from 2001 to 2008. Therefore, the
value of 0.415 will be used for the solution of the model.
The steady-state share of government expenditures on income is computed as
a share of government consumption on GDP (the data were downloaded from the
website of the Czech Statistical Office). Surprisingly, the average value of this fraction
is almost identical to that of the USA, assumed in Galí et al. (2007) (estimated as 0.2)
and its size is γg = 0.21 for the Czech economy. Steady state consumption/output
ratio follows from market clearing conditions:
γc =
C
Y
= 1− I
Y
− G
Y
= 1− δY
K
− γg = (1− γg)− δα(ρ+ δ)(1+ µp)
The last identity follows from two facts. First, in the steady state, Q = 1 so there
are no capital adjustment costs and thus the real rental rate is equal to the sum of
real interest rate and depreciation rate: R
k
P = ρ+ δ (households must be indifferent
between lending their savings in the form of capital or purchase of bonds. Second,
the first order condition of Equation 4.18 with respect to capital implies: R
k
P =
λ
1+µp
Y
K
(Lagrange multiplier is interpreted as the marginal cost, which equals λ = 11+µp in the
steady state).
The previous relation for the steady state share of consumption on output implies
the value γc = 0.52.
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5.3 Share of rule-of-thumb households - parameter λ
A crucial parameter of the model presented in this thesis is the parameter λ, which
quantifies the share of rule-of-thumb households in the economy. The existence of this
parameter is the main component which distinguishes the model from the standard
New-Keynesian models. Also, the impact of fiscal policy changes depends crucially
on the magnitude of this parameter, as I will show consequently. Therefore, a separate
section will be devoted to the estimation of the parameter.
Two approaches to the estimation of the parameter λ exist in the literature. The
first is based on microeconomic data and requires a sizeable panel of household data.
The second approach, which I will use, is based on an approximation using aggregate
macroeconomic variables and follows the "lambda model" presented in the paper by
Campbell and Mankiw (1989).
Assume again, that the size of the population is normalized to 1 and that the pro-
portion 1− λ behaves optimally, that is their behaviour complies with the permanent
income hypothesis. Income of optimizing households is denoted as Yot = (1− λ)Yt
and income of non-optimizing households is Yrt = λYt. The total income is given as
the sum of incomes of the two types of households, i.e. Yt = Yot + Y
r
t . Under the
assumptions stated in the literature review (utility is quadratic and preference pa-
rameter β is equal to real interest rate r), the consumption of optimizing households
follows a random walk: ∆Cot = (1− λ)et, where et is a white noise process, which
represents an innovation to permanent income. On the other hand, non-Ricardian
households consume their current income, Crt = λYt, thus ∆C
r
t = λ∆Yt. From the
definition of aggregate consumption (Ct = Crt + C
o
t ), one obtains:
∆Ct = ∆Crt + ∆C
o
t = λ∆Yt + (1− λ)et (5.3)
This is an estimable equation and can be interpreted as an alternative hypothesis
to the permanent income hypothesis. When λ is significantly larger than zero, one
can conclude that the permanent income hypothesis is rejected, since the proportion
λ of households does not behave optimally, i.e. these households do not consume
their permanent income. Instead, they consume their current income. However, one
needs to be cautions when estimating parameter λ using the previous equation. It is
very likely that cov(et,∆Yt) 6= 0, thus the method of ordinary least squares provides
an inconsistent estimate of λ. Therefore, one needs to find valid instruments of ∆Yt
and use a two stage least squares regression.
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One possible set of instruments of ∆Yt is a set of all lagged variables, because they
are by definition orthogonal to et. Also, a valid instrument must be correlated with
∆Yt, so all lagged stationary variables which help to predict income growth can be
used as an instrument.
Two additional problems need to be taken into account for the estimation, as
Campbell and Mankiw (1989) argue. First, the variables of our interest, consump-
tion and income, are non-stationary and their mean and variance increase with the
level of innovations. Therefore, logarithms of variables are used instead of raw series.
This does not cause any changes for the interpretation of parameter λ, because the es-
timated equation can be interpreted as a log-linear approximation to the true model.
The second problem is that data at specific points in time are not available. Instead,
aggregate volumes for quarterly periods are available. Therefore, as Campbell and
Mankiw (1989) argue that the change in consumption is autocorrelated, instruments
that are lagged at least twice from the original variable have to be used.
The quarterly data used for the estimation of the parameter λ for the Czech re-
public were downloaded from the OECD statistics database. They span from the first
quarter of 1995 to the last quarter of 2010, i.e. 64 observations were collected. As
the data on disposable income were not available, I have used quarterly data on GDP
as a proxy (the same approach was taken by Campbell and Mankiw (1989) for the
estimation of the parameter λ of some non-US countries). Both series on GDP and
consumption were seasonally adjusted, converted into real terms and to per capita
values.
Three sets of instruments were used - lagged GDP values, lagged consumption
values and finally lagged interest rate, which is given by quarterly 3m interbank rate.
Together 9 regressions were estimated and their results are presented in Table 5.1.
The first one disregards the fact that variable ∆Yt needs to be instrumented. Not
surprisingly, an OLS estimate provides a meaningless result.
As I have shown, the results of the estimation differ when various instruments are
used. The most meaningful result seems to be 40.27% from regression 8. One can
argue that R2 is higher in the first stage in the first stage of regression 7. But I would
claim that this result can be disregarded, since changes interest rate do not have any
explanatory power for future income, as the first stage of regression 6 shows.
The last column of Table 5.1 presents the result of the Sargan test of over-identifying
restrictions. The null hypothesis of the test is that none of the instruments is corre-
lated with the residuals from the IV regression. This would imply that the instruments
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Equation Instruments λ estimate First stage Overidentification test
(s.e.) (R2) (p-value)
1 None -0.0436794 - -
(OLS) (0.1084673)
2 ∆(L2yt, . . . , L4yt) 0.8132888 0.1208 1.33886
(0.3010564) (0.0178) (0.512)
3 ∆(L2yt, . . . , L6yt) 0.7157121 0.0997 3.48998
(0.2766958) (0.0643) (0.4794)
4 ∆(L2ct, . . . , L4ct) 0.2888788 0.0284 4.28792
(0.3820936) (0.2081) (0.1172)
5 ∆(L2ct, . . . , L6ct) 0.2859378 0.0162 4.28197
(0.3283623) (0.3299) (0.3692)
6 ∆(L2it, . . . , L4it) 0.3462353 -0.0448 2.0517
(1.544126) (0.9514) (0.3585)
7 ∆(L2it, . . . , L6it) -0.224346 -0.0736 3.36314
(1.101624) (0.9699) (0.499)
8 ∆(L2yt, . . . , L4yt), 0.402664 0.2083 7.48463
∆(L2ct, . . . , L4ct), (0.1942862) (0.0072) (0.2783)
L2ct − L2yt
9 ∆(L2yt, . . . , L4yt), 0.2921848 0.2611 11.3413
∆(L2ct, . . . , L4ct), (0.1718933) (0.0045) (0.253)
∆(L2it, . . . , L4it),
L2ct − L2yt
Table 5.1: Proportion of rule-of-thumb households estimates
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are valid. P-values reported in the fifth column of the table indicate that none of the
instruments in any estimated equation is exogenous. Therefore, instruments used in
the regression were valid.
There is one further issue which should be taken into when estimating parameter
λ. Recently, Andersson (2010) has argued, that parameter λ is significantly biased
downwards when one uses the estimation procedure that I have used. This is because
the model is designed for aggregate variables and per capita variables are used for
the estimation. The correct estimation equation should be the same as the above, but
instead of changes in income of the whole population, only changes in rule-of-thumb
consumers’ income should be used. Unfortunately, no remedy can be used in the
model, as one would have to know the income of rule-of-thumb consumers, which is
impossible.
However, one lesson can be learnt from the mentioned paper - the estimate that I
have obtained can be considered a lower bound on the proportion of rule-of-thumb
consumers. Therefore, I will provide a sensitivity analysis of the behaviour of the
model, with respect to parameter λ.
5.4 Fiscal policy parameters
To estimate parameters φb and φg from the fiscal policy rule (Equation 4.27), I have
performed a historical decomposition of a four-variable VAR model from Section 3.1,
where government debt is used as the fourth variable. That is, I have estimated the
VAR model and identified the historical structural shocks using the relation et =
B−1Aut (where et is a vector of structural shocks and ut is a vector of reduced-form
shocks). Then, I have simulated time series that one would observe if only shocks to
GDP affected the deviations from the predicted values by the estimated VAR model.
That is, this time series has the following form:
Y˜t = µ+ K(L, q)Y˜t−1 + A−1BE˜t
where E˜t is a vector of shocks, where the shocks pertaining to shocks other than
the shocks to GDP are set to zero.
After the variation due to GDP shocks was identified, I have computed exogenous
variation due to these shocks (i.e. Y˜t − Yt) and regressed those of debt on those of
government spending and taxes. The source code of the procedure written in EViews
is listed in Appendix.
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Unfortunately, the results of this method are not robust when it is applied on
the Czech data and they differ when the estimation is performed using various time
periods of the data. Also, the results are sensitive with respect to the method of
seasonal adjustment that is used to adjust the data.
Table 5.2 presents the estimates using 16 various specifications. The time series
were seasonally adjusted using X12 and TRAMO procedures. The estimations were
performed using the whole sample (1998:1 to 2010:4) and three sub-samples. Also,
the identification of structural errors was performed in two ways - based on structural
decomposition described in Section 3.1 and based on ordering.
The estimates are most meaningful (i.e., they are relatively similar to those esti-
mated for the US and the eurozone) when they are estimated using the whole sample.
When the time series ends before 2010, the results are sensible until the first quarter of
2009 and then they are similar to those estimated in the second rows (1998:1 - 2008:1).
Also, the estimates are sensible in the third rows (2000:1 - 2010:4). Also, it should be
noted that the results are statistically insignificant. The reason for this is that time
series is relatively short and the fiscal rule might have been manifested only in the
last periods (the government had not been bound much by the level of deficits and
debt before the recent economic slowdown). Therefore, for the calibration purposes, I
will use the longest possible time period.
Table 5.2 also present two possibilities of the VAR model specification - with one
lag and two lags of endogenous variables included in the model. The parameters do
not change dramatically under the two specifications but still their values vary.
For the solution of the model, I will use two sets of parameters: 1) φg = 0.11 and
φb = 0.24; 2) φg = 0.06 and φb = 0.19. These parameters are consistent with those
estimated using a similar method by Galí et al. (2007) using the same procedure for
the U.S. - φg = 0.12, φb = 0.3 and also those estimated by Coenen and Straub (2004)
using Bayesian inference for the eurozone (under the specification of lump-sum and
distortionary taxes, which approximates the reality better than the specification under
the lump-sum taxes only): φg = 0.123, φb = 0.292.
The parameter ρg was set as ρg = 0.9, which is consistent with the two papers cited
above. Also, a sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter will be performed.
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Table 5.2: Estimates of fiscal policy rule parameters under various specifications and
seasonal adjustments
X12 TRAMO
2 lags
period structural ordering structural ordering
φg φb φg φb φg φb φg φb
1998:1 2010:4 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.16 0.11 0.24 0.03 0.24
1998:1 2008:1 0.02 -0.25 -0.03 -0.29 -0.05 -0.14 -0.09 -0.19
2000:1 2010:4 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.1 -0.02 0.06
2000:1 2008:1 0.01 -0.41 -0.04 -0.44 -0.07 -0.21 -0.11 -0.27
1 lag
period structural ordering structural ordering
φg φb φg φb φg φb φg φb
1998:1 2010:4 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.1 0.06 0.19 -0.005 0.17
1998:1 2008:1 0.03 -0.21 0.01 -0.24 -0.05 -0.11 -0.06 -0.14
2000:1 2010:4 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.1 -0.04 0.05 -0.1 0.03
2000:1 2008:1 0.03 -0.21 0.01 -0.24 -0.07 -0.24 -0.1 -0.3
Chapter6
Results and sensitivity analysis
This chapter analyses the results of the model presented in the previous chapters
and presents sensitivity analyses with respect to several parameters. Because the
estimation of fiscal policy parameters has proved not to be robust, I will show two
sets of results and sensitivity analyses with respect to each parameter. Throughout
this chapter, Fiscal rule 1 refers to the rule, where φg = 0.11 and φb = 0.24 and Fiscal
rule 2 refers to the set of fiscal policy parameters, where φg = 0.06 and φb = 0.19. The
reason for the choice of these parameters were given in the previous chapter.
Figure 6.1 presents the results of the two scenarios - responses of all variables of
the model to a five percentage shock to governmental expenditures normalized by the
level of output (i.e. the log-deviations of variables are measured in terms of percentage
GDP deviations)1. We can observe that the government spending multiplier is very
close to one in the first case, while it is smaller than one in the second case. The
response of aggregate consumption is determined by the response of each type of
households and the proportion of each type of households. The response of Ricardian
households is by and large similar - due to a negative wealth effect of governmental
consumption, which is caused by a higher tax burden in the future, these households
cut back on their consumption and increase their labour supply. The extent of the
wealth effect depends on the fiscal rule, i.e. how the tax profile changes over time.
Because the value of both parameters is higher under Fiscal rule 1, the debt of the
government is repaid faster and consumption reverts back faster as well under this
rule. The total level of consumption is a convex combination of its two components.
1Figure B.1 in the Appendix presents the impulse responses to a fiscal shock when the fiscal rule
estimated for the eurozone is assumed (φg = 0.123, φb = 0.292). The results are qualitatively similar to
those under Fiscal rule 1, however, the impulse profiles slightly differ quantitatively.
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Therefore, if the proportion of the rule-of-thumb households was higher, we would
observe more periods where total consumption increases with respect to its steady
state after a government spending shock.
Aggregate hours worked increase in both cases and it is because of a higher de-
mand by firms, that need to produce more in order to meet an increased demand by
the government. This increase in labour demand is met by the labour supply because
of the negative wealth effect of the increased government consumption. In contrast
with RBC models, an increase in hours worked is accompanied by an increase in real
wages.
Sensitivity analysis
As Galí et al. (2007) point out, the conditions for the unique solution are altered under
the presence of rule-of-thumb households compared to the standard New Keynesian
model. In the latter model, it is sufficient to have φpi > 1 in order to achieve a
unique solution (this result is known as the Taylor principle). However, the Taylor
principle does not hold in this model any more. Figure 6.2 shows the combinations
of parameters λ (the proportion of rule-of-thumb households) and θ (price stickiness)
under which the determinacy is achieved, given that other parameters are fixed at
their baseline values (recall that φpi = 1.5). The white space denotes the combinations
that achieve an indeterminate solution. Also, we can observe that the combination of
our parameters (λ = 0.4 and θ = 0.8) still achieves a unique solution.
As I have stated in this section, the aggregate consumption is a convex combination
of the consumption of each type of households. Therefore, it is not surprising that
the aggregate consumption rises as a result of an increase in the proportion of rule-
of-thumb households. This is depicted in Figure B.2. This figure and all that follow
show results only for those parameter values for which the unique solution exists.
Therefore, for example, the parameter λ ranges from zero to 0.45, approximately.
Figure B.3 shows that output, consumption and investment are increasing in the
degree of price stickiness. All variables rise more rapidly for extremely high values of
θ. Costs of investment (captured by parameter η) have obviously the largest impact
on investments (Figure B.4). When the costs are prohibitively large (η = 0), the
investment does not react to government spending shock at all. Furthermore, as
expected, the response of investment is larger the higher the parameter η. Similarly
but to a smaller degree, both output and consumption are decreasing in parameter η.
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Figure 6.1: Model impulse responses
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Figure 6.2: Combinations of θ (price stickiness) and λ (share of rule-of-thumb house-
holds) parameters that assure a unique solution of the model
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The response of aggregate variables to a change in θ is similar as for parameter η -
the relation among them is negative, but the three variables do not respond so much.
Policy parameters remain to complete the sensitivity analysis. As Galí et al. (2007)
argue, the graph of impact responses with respect to φpi (Figure B.6) is an inverse one
to the one where θ is on the x axis. This is because the monetary authority can achieve
the responses of variables by varying parameter φpi that would arise under various
parameters of price stickiness. The impact response of output and consumption is
decreasing in parameter ρg, the persistence of government spending shocks (Figure
B.7). This is because a higher persistence means higher spending in the future, which
implies a larger negative wealth effect. Therefore, the Ricardian households save more
to the detriment of consumption.
The two fiscal policy parameters have an opposite effect - crowding in of con-
sumption is decreasing in parameter φg, as one can observe in Figure B.8, (deficit will
increase more on impact, thus higher disposable income remains to households) and
increasing in φb (the debt will be repaid sooner but in later periods), which is depicted
in Figure B.9.
Chapter7
Conclusion
This thesis has analysed the effects of fiscal spending shocks on the Czech economy.
The study of the literature has suggested that the standard RBC and New Keyne-
sian models have difficulties in predicting the effects of fiscal policy on the economy,
particularly in predicting the response of private consumption. A possible reason of
this problem is that they ignore the fact that a significant fraction of population does
not behave in a forward-looking manner, i.e. they consume their whole current in-
come instead of their permanent income, as these models assume. Therefore, I have
used a variant of the New Keynesian model, where rule-of-thumb households, which
consume their current income, coexist with the standard Ricardian households.
The results of the model suggest that output increases following a government
spending shock but the response is less than proportional, so the government spend-
ing multiplier does not exceed one. The response of consumption depends on the
share of Ricardian households in the economy. These households increase their labour
supply following a government spending shock and decrease their consumption due
to a negative wealth effect. The reaction of the rule-of-thumb households is different
- their consumption increases due to higher income, which stems from higher wages.
The aggregate consumption rises more when the share of rule-of-thumb households
is higher. The response of other aggregate variables is similar as in other models -
investments are crowded out and total hours worked increase.
These results imply several policy recommendations. Because the responses of
output and consumption to a government spending spending shock do not seem to
be large (based on both empirical and theoretical analyses), the long-term costs of
fiscal stabilization seem to be relatively larger compared to its benefits. Therefore,
a fiscal stimulus should be used only in deeper economic downturns to stabilize
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output. In deeper recessions, the share of rule-of-thumb households is higher due
to the difficulties of low-income households in accessing credit markets to smooth
their consumption. Therefore, the response of output and consumption is stronger,
which provides a case for fiscal policy action. Also, fiscal spending should be aimed at
liquidity constrained households, which would spend their additional income instead
of saving it for even worse times. Finally, the stance of the government to its debt
is important. When the government reacts to the level of debt in a stronger way,
i.e. when taxes are increased more when the debt rises in order to repay it, the
effectiveness of fiscal policy is expected to be higher. This is because forward-looking
households expect an increase in taxation soon, thus they increase their labour supply
more, which boosts the output.
The sensitivity analysis has shown that the magnitude of the response of each
variable depends crucially on the expectations of future behaviour of the government,
which is summarized in the fiscal rule. This rule has been estimated on relatively
short time series and there is a large uncertainty about its parameters. Also, the
model used for the analysis assumes a closed economy, but the Czech Republic is a
small open economy. Therefore, future research of fiscal policy effects should focus
on open economy models which incorporate rule of-thumb-consumers. I expect that
the response of output and consumption to fiscal spending shocks would be weaker
in those models than in the model presented in this thesis. Nonetheless, this does not
alter the recommendations stated above.
AppendixA
Baseline model parameters
Parameter Description of the parameter Value
Preference, technology parameters
β Discount factor 0.99
e Elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods 11
δ Depreciation rate 0.025
η Elasticity of investment w.r.t. Tobin’s Q 2
α Capital share on output 0.41
ψ Wage elasticity w.r.t. hours 0.5
General parameters (for which sensitivity analysis will be performed)
λ Proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers 0.4
θ Price stickiness - fraction of firms that leave their 0.8
prices unchanged
Policy parameters
φpi Response of the monetary authority to inflation 1.5
φg Response of taxes to gov. expenditures 0.11 / 0.06
φb Response of taxes to debt 0.24 / 0.19
γg Average government spending share on GDP 0.21
ρg AR(1) parameter in the government spending shock 0.9
Table A.1: Baseline model parameters
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Figure B.1: Impulse response functions - EU fiscal rule
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Figure B.2: Impact multipliers: sensitivity with respect to parameter λ (share of rule-
of thumb households) under two fiscal policy rule scenarios
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Figure B.3: Impact multipliers: sensitivity with respect to parameter θ (price sticki-
ness) under two fiscal policy rule scenarios
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Figure B.4: Impact multipliers: sensitivity with respect to parameter η (elasticity of
investment w.r.t. Tobin’s Q) under two fiscal policy rule scenarios
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Figure B.5: Impact multipliers: sensitivity with respect to parameter ψ (elasticity of
wages w.r.t. labour supply) under two fiscal policy rule scenarios
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Figure B.6: Impact multipliers: sensitivity with respect to parameter φpi (response of
monetary policy to inflation) under two fiscal policy rule scenarios
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Figure B.7: Impact multipliers: sensitivity with respect to parameter ρg (persistence
of government spending shocks) under two fiscal policy rule scenarios
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Figure B.8: Impact multipliers: sensitivity with respect to parameter φg (response of
taxes to spending) under two fiscal policy rule scenarios
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Figure B.9: Impact multipliers: sensitivity with respect to parameter φb (response of
taxes to debt) under two fiscal policy rule scenarios
AppendixC
Log-linear approximation around steady
state
In the main body of the thesis, I have omitted the derivation of equations representing
log-linearized equilibrium conditions. This was done in order to make the text as
lucid and brief as possible. As the log-linearization is a technical procedure, I have
postponed it into this section of the Appendix. I will use the method by Uhlig (1999)
for log-linearization, which will be summarized in the following text.
Log-linear deviation of a positive variable xt from its positive steady state value
X is defined as x˜t = log xt − log X. It is approximately equal to its percentage devi-
ation from the steady state value: log xt − log X = log(Xt−XX + 1) ∼= Xt−XX , where the
approximation log(1 + a) ∼= a can be used for small values of a. By a simple trans-
formation, we can write xt = Xex˜t , which is a precise identity. Using the fact that for
small values of x˜t, we can use approximation ex˜t ∼= 1+ x˜t, we arrive at the Rule 1:
Rule 1: xt ∼= X(1+ x˜t).
The second rule of log-linearization enables us to simplify most of expressions:
Rule 2: x˜ty˜t ∼= 0. Because we assume that variables characterizing the economy
are very close to their steady state values, we can approximate products of their log-
deviations from the steady state values as zero.
Rule 3: f (xt) ∼= f (X)(1+ ex˜t), where e = ∂ f (X)∂X Xf (X) .
This rule is used to approximate a function of a variable using its steady state
value and log-linear deviation from its steady state value. This rule follows from the
first order Taylor expansion and Rule 1:
f (xt) ∼= f (X) + f ′(X)(xt − X) = f (X) + e f (X)X (X(1+ x˜t)− X) = f (X)(1+ ex˜t)
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Equation 4.30
First, we need to obtain an approximation of φt+1 term using Rule 3. Start with the
elasticity of function φ with respect to IK in its steady state:
e
φ
I
K
= φ′
(
I
K
)
I
K
1
φ( IK )
= φ′( I
K
)δ
1
φ(δ)
= 1
where the fact that IK = δ holds in the steady state and the properties of function
φ are used.
Now, using Rule 3, arrive at the approximation:
φ(
It
Kt
) ∼= φ( I
K
)(1+ i˜t − k˜t) = δ(1+ i˜t − k˜t).
To log-linearize Equation 4.8, rewrite it into the following form (using Equation
4.10 and the fact that φ′t+1 =
1
Qt+1
):
PtQtRt = Et
{
Rt+1 + Pt+1Qt+1
(
(1− δ) + φt+1 − It+1Kt+1
1
Qt+1
)}
Using a straightforward application of Rule 1, obtain:
PQR(1+ p˜t + q˜t + r˜t) =Et {R(1+ r˜t) + PQ(1− δ)(1+ p˜t+1 + q˜t+1)+
+PQ(1+ p˜t+1 + q˜t+1)δ(1+ i˜t+1 − k˜t+1)−
−PI
K
(1+ p˜t+1 + i˜t+1 − k˜t+1)
}
Now, use the fact that the steady state values of price level and Tobin’s Q are P = 1
and Q = 1, respectively. The steady state value of interest rate is R = 1β and the steady
state fraction IK = δ. Finally, pit+1 = p˜t+1 − p˜t. Using these facts and some tedious
algebra, we obtain Equation 4.30.
Equation 4.35
First, subtract the steady state identity C¯r = W¯P¯ N¯
r − T¯ from Equation 4.13 and divide
the equation by C¯. Obtain
crt =
WtNt
PtC¯
− W¯N¯
r
P¯C¯
− tt Y¯C
Now apply Rule 2: Wt NtPt
∼= WNP [1+ w˜t + n˜t − p˜t]. Plugging from Equation 4.34
into the previous equation, results in Equation 4.35.
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Equation 4.34
To log-linearize the condition WtPt = CtN
φ
t , first take logarithm of this equality, subtract
the logarithm of steady-state value and obtain Equation 4.34.
Equation 4.36
The equation holds also in the steady state: C¯ = λC¯r + (1− λ)C¯o. When we subtract
this identity from and divide by the steady state value of consumption C¯, we obtain
Equation 4.36 (here we employ the fact that a percentage deviation of a variable from
its steady state is approximately equal to the log-deviation of a variable from the
steady state).
Equation 4.42
First, divide Equation 4.25 by Pt−1 and rewrite it as
∞
∑
k=0
Et
{
Λt,t+kYt+k(j)
P∗t
Pt−1
}
=
∞
∑
k=0
Et
{
Λt,t+kYt+k(j)µMCt+k
Pt+k
Pt−1
}
In the log-linearization, I will use several approximations (which follow from sim-
ple applications of the stated rules and steady state identities):
Yt+k(j) =
(
P∗t
Pt+k
)−e
Yt ∼= PPY(1− e(p
∗
t − pt+k))
P∗t
Pt−1
∼= (1+ p∗t − pt−1)
Pt+k
Pt−1
∼= (1+ pt+k − pt−1)
MCt+k ∼= 1M (1+ mˆct+k(j))
Λt,t+k = βk
(
Ct+k
Ct
)−1( Pt
Pt+k
)
∼= βk(1− (ct+k − ct) + pt − pt+k)
Now approximate the left hand side using the stated approximations and using
the fact that the product of two variables in log-deviations can be approximated as
zero and arrive at the following equation:
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p∗t − pt−1 = (1− βθ)
∞
∑
k=0
Et (θβ)k {mˆct+k + pt+k − pt−1}
where individual firm marginal costs mˆct+k(j) were replaced by economy-wide
marginal costs mˆct+k due to constant returns to scale.
Now realize the following identity:
∞
∑
k=0
(θβ)k(pt+k − pt−1) = pt − pt−1 + θβ(pt+1 − pt + pt − pt−1)+
+θ2β2(pt+2 − pt+1 + pt+1 − pt + pt − pt−1) + . . . =
= pit + θβ(pit+1 + pit) + θ2β2(pit+2 + pit+1 + pit) + . . . =
= pit
1
1− θβ + θβpit+1
1
1− βθ + . . . =
=
1
1− βθ
(
∞
∑
k=0
(θβ)kEtpit+k
)
Therefore, we can write
p∗t − pt−1 = (1− βθ)
∞
∑
k=0
Et (θβ)k {mˆct+k}+
∞
∑
k=0
(θβ)kEtpit+k
This can be rewritten as the following difference equation:
p∗t − pt−1 = θβEt
{
p∗t+1 − pt
}
+ (1− θβ)mˆct + pit
Now log-linearize Equation 4.23: pit = (1− θ)(p∗t − pt−1).
and combine the two previous equations:
pit = βEtpit+1 + λpmˆct
where λ = (1−θ)(1−θβ)θ
Finally, define µpt ≡ −mˆct
Equation 4.44, 4.45 and 4.46
All of the equations can be log-linearized by taking logarithms and subtracting the
logarithms of their steady-state values. Next, constant terms in Equations 4.44 and
4.45 are omitted.
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Equation 4.49
Using the method described above, we can rewrite the market clearing condition as:
Y¯(1 + y˜t) = C¯(1 + c˜t) + I¯(1 + i˜t) + G¯(1 + g˜t). Now subtract the steady state identity
Y¯ = C¯ + I¯ + G¯, divide by Y¯ and rewrite G¯Y¯ g˜t =
Gt−G¯
G¯
G¯
Y¯ = gt
Equation 4.31
First, rewrite Equation 4.31 as Qtφ′
(
It
Kt
)
= 1. Using Rule 1 (on Qt)and Rule 3 (on
φ′
(
It
Kt
)
), obtain
Q(1+ q˜t)φ′
(
I
K
)[
1+ φ′′
(
I
K
)
I
K
1
φ′
( I
K
) (i˜t − k˜t)] = 1 (C.1)
Divide by the steady-state values and use the fact that IK = δ and φ
′ ( I
K
)
= 1 and
obtain
(1+ q˜t)(1− 1
η
(i˜t − k˜t)) = 1 (C.2)
By an application of Rule 2, obtain Equation 4.31.
Equation 4.32
First, rewrite Equation 4.32 as Kt+1Kt = (1− δ) + φ
(
It
Kt
)
Using Rule 2 and 3, obtain:
K
K
(
1+ k˜t+1 − k˜t
)
= 1− δ+ φ
(
I
K
)[
1+
φ′( IK )
I
K
φ( IK )
(i˜t − k˜t)
]
(C.3)
Now, using the fact that the steady state investment - capital ratio IK = δ and the
assumptions on the capital adjustment costs, we obtain Equation 4.32.
Equation 4.33
Rewrite the equation that we want to log-linearize:
1 = RtEt
{
β
Cot
Cot+1
Pt
P1+1
}
By an application of the log-linearization method described above, we obtain: 1 ∼=
R¯βp¯i(1+ r˜t + c˜ot − c˜ot+1 − p˜it+1)
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Dividing by the steady state identity 1 = Rβp¯i, subtracting 1 and rearranging
results in c˜ot = Et {c˜t+1}+ pit+1 − rt. Now multiply both sides of the equation by C¯
o
C¯ ,
use the definitions of ct and ct+1 and obtain Equation 4.33.
Equation 4.47
First, express variables in terms of their log-deviations (which are defined in the text):
Gt = gtY + G; Tt = ttY + T; Bt = Pt−1(btY +
B
P
); Bt+1 = Pt(bt+1Y +
B
P
)
Also, these log-linear approximation will be used:
R−1t =
1
1+ ρ
(1− r˜t)
Pt−1
Pt
= 1− pit
Plug these expressions into the government budget constraint (Equation 4.26):
Pt(ttY + T) +
1− r˜t
1+ ρ
Pt(bt+1Y +
B
P
) = Pt−1(btY +
B
P
) + Pt(gtY + G)
Now divide by Pt−1, use the fact that the budget is balanced in the steady state
(T = G), the government has zero debt (B = 0) and use Rule 2. Then we obtain
tt +
bt+1
1+ρ = bt + gt which can be easily rewritten as Equation 4.47.
C.0.1 Steady state values of γc and γo
Parameter γo = C
o
C is the proportion of the consumption of optimizing households on
total consumption. The steady state values of consumption of rule-of-thumb house-
holds implies:
Cr =
WλN
P
− λT
This can be rewritten using the steady state relation T = G (budget is balanced in
the steady state) as
(1− γo) = λ
(
WN
PC
− G
C
)
Using WNPC =
1−α
(1+µp)γc
, we can express γo from the previous equation as
γo = 1− λ
(
1− α
(1+ µp)γc
− γg
γc
)
AppendixD
Dynare and EViews codes
D.1 Dynare solution of the model
var n, c, infl, k, b, g;
varexo e;
parameters alpha, beta, delta, eps, eta, gamma_c, gamma_c_tilde, gamma_g,
gamma_o, lambda, lambda_p, mu_p, omega, phi_b, phi_g, phi_pi, psi, rho,
rho_g, sigma_tilde, theta, theta_n, theta_t;
alpha = 0.415;
beta = 0.99;
rho = 1/beta-1;
delta = 0.025;
psi = 0.5;
eta = 2;
lambda = 0.4;
eps = 11;
theta = 0.8;
gamma_g = 0.21;
mu_p = eps/(eps-1)-1;
gamma_c = 1-gamma_g-alpha*delta/((rho+delta)*(1+mu_p));
gamma_o = 1-lambda*((1-alpha)/(1+mu_p)/gamma_c-gamma_g/gamma_c);
gamma_c_tilde = gamma_c + gamma_g;
phi_pi = 1.5;
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rho_g = 0.9;
phi_g = 0.11;
phi_b = 0.24;
lambda_p = (1-beta*theta)*(1-theta)/theta;
omega = eta*(1-beta*(1-delta))*(1-gamma_c_tilde);
theta_n = lambda*(1-alpha)*(1+psi)/(gamma_c*(1+mu_p)-lambda*(1-alpha));
theta_t = lambda*(1+mu_p)/(gamma_c*(1+mu_p)-lambda*(1-alpha));
sigma_tilde = (gamma_c*(1+mu_p)-lambda*(1-alpha))/(gamma_o*gamma_c*
(1-lambda)*(1+mu_p));
model(linear) ;
k=(1-delta+delta*alpha/(1-gamma_c_tilde))*k(-1)+
delta*(1-alpha)/(1-gamma_c_tilde)*n(-1)-
delta*gamma_c/(1-gamma_c_tilde)*c(-1)-delta/(1-gamma_c_tilde)*g(-1);
infl=beta*infl(+1)+lambda_p*c-alpha*lambda_p*k+(alpha+psi)*lambda_p*n;
(1-alpha)*n-gamma_c*c-(1-gamma_c_tilde-alpha)*k+
(1-gamma_c_tilde)*eta*phi_pi*infl=(omega*(1+psi)+beta*(1-alpha))*n(+1)+
(omega-beta*gamma_c)*c(+1)-(omega+beta*(1-gamma_c_tilde-alpha))*k(+1)+
(1-gamma_c_tilde)*eta*infl(+1)+(1-beta*rho_g)*g;
b=(1+rho)*(1-phi_b)*b(-1)+(1+rho)*(1-phi_g)*g(-1);
g=rho_g*g(-1)+e;
c-theta_n*n+phi_pi/sigma_tilde*infl=c(+1)+1/sigma_tilde*infl(+1)-
theta_n*n(+1)+theta_t*phi_b*(b(+1)-b)+theta*phi_g*(rho_g-1)*g;
end;
initval;
n = 0;
c = 0;
infl = 0;
k = 0;
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b = 0;
g = 0;
end;
check;
shocks;
var e; stderr 0.05;
end;
steady;
check;
stoch_simul(nograph);
figure;
impulses;
phi_b = 0.19;
phi_g = 0.06;
steady;
check;
stoch_simul(nograph);
figure;
impulses;
D.2 EViews code for historical decomposition
' structural decomposition or ordering?
' 1: structural
' 2: ordering
open "fisvar.wf1"
scalar decomp = 2
!l = 0
' generate dummy variable
series dum = 0
dum(35) = 1
genr d1=@seas(1)
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genr d2=@seas(2)
genr d3=@seas(3)
genr time = @trend+1
'===== generate per capita real seasonally adjusted series =====
' GDP
series lgdp = log(gdp/deflator/pop*1000)
lgdp.tramoseats(save=sa)
' Government revenue
series lgrev = log(grev/deflator/pop*1000)
lgrev.tramoseats(save=sa)
' Government expenditures
series lgexp = log(gexp/deflator/pop*1000)
lgexp.tramoseats(save=sa)
' Government debt
series lgdebt = log(gdebt/deflator/pop*1000)
' 4 VAR
matrix(4,4) M
matrix(4,4) N
if decomp == 1 then
M.fill(b=r) 1, 0, 0, 0, NA, 1, NA, 0, 0, -1.3, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
N.fill(b=r) NA, 0, 0, 0, 0, NA, 0, 0, NA, 0, NA, 0, NA, NA, NA, NA
endif
if decomp == 2 then
M.fill(b=r) 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1
N.fill(b=r) NA, 0, 0, 0, 0, NA, 0, 0, NA, NA, NA, 0, NA, NA, NA, NA
endif
'============ var: exp, gdp, rev, debt =================
pagestruct(start=1998:1, end=2010:4)
time = @trend+1
group gvar5 lgexp_sa lgdp_sa lgrev_sa lgdebt
var vardebt.ls 1 2 gvar5 @ c dum d1 d2 d3 time
vardebt.svar(rtype=patsr,namea=M,nameb=N)
' save matrices from structural factorization: Au = Be
matrix mata = vardebt.@svaramat
matrix matb = vardebt.@svarbmat
' save residuals into matrix merr
vardebt.makeresids r1 r2 r3 r4
group err r1 r2 r3 r4
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' merr: matrix with structural errors
stomna(err, merr)
'================ structural errors ====================
vector(4) aux ' auxiliary vector
' matrix with structural errors: mserr
matrix(@obs(time),4) mserr
for !j = 1 to @obs(time)
aux =@transpose(@rowextract(merr,!j))
aux = @inverse(matb)*mata*aux
rowplace(mserr,@transpose(aux),!j)
next
' matrix with structural government errors only
matrix(@obs(time),4) mgovshock
colplace(mgovshock,@columnextract(mserr,2),2)
' matrix with reduced shocks only
for !j = 1 to @obs(time)
aux=@transpose(@rowextract(mgovshock,!j))
aux = @inverse(mata)*matb*aux
rowplace(mgovshock,@transpose(aux),!j)
next
'=============== historical decomposition ===============
vardebt.makemodel(debtmod)
series b1 = lgexp_sa
series b2 = lgdp_sa
series b3 = lgrev_sa
series b4 = lgdebt
for !j = 3+!l to @obs(time)
debtmod.solve
lgexp_sa(!j) = lgexp_sa_0(!j)+mgovshock(!j,1)
lgdp_sa(!j) = lgdp_sa_0(!j)+mgovshock(!j,2)
lgrev_sa(!j) = lgrev_sa_0(!j)+mgovshock(!j,3)
lgdebt(!j) = lgdebt_0(!j)+mgovshock(!j,4)
next
'================ Fiscal rule - Regression =====================
series exo_debt = b4-lgdebt
series exo_exp = b1-lgexp_sa
series exo_rev = b3-lgrev_sa
equation fisrule.ls exo_rev exo_exp exo_debt
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